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INTRODUCTION
Since the mid-1960s Romania has radically changed
its foreign policy and has pursued a new course of
international conduct characterized by analysts as
1
"dissident" or "deviant." This shift came as a surprise to
foreign political observers because the country was at the
time considered to be among the most reliable satellites of
the Soviet Union.
The new direction of Romania's foreign policy was
clearly expressed in the celebrated "Statement on the Stand
of the Romanian Workers' Party Concerning the Problems of
International Communist and Working Class Movement" issued
3
by the Romanian Communist Party (RCP), in April 1964. This
statement which came to be known as Romania's "Declaration
of Independence," proclaimed the country's opposition to
Soviet domination and its firm desire for an independent
status in the communist world. The declaration, expressed
in a defiant, nationalistic tone, became the ideological
base for Romanian "national communism," a force skillfully
exploited by the RCP, on the one hand for rejecting Soviet
supremacy and, on the other, for consolidating the RCP's
4
domestic monopoly of power.
This study endeavors to examine why Romania's
dissidence within the Soviet bloc has not provoked a
military response by the Soviet Union. The hypothesis set
out here is that Romania's autonomous foreign policy was
tolerated by the Soviet Union because the RCP preserved an
orthodox communist ideology internally along the lines of
the Soviet model and retained exclusive control over
domestic political power. This total control led in time to
an increasingly oppressive domestic policy which became the
Party's lever for satisfying Soviet concerns regarding the
security of communist ideology in the face of Romania's
questionable international behavior.
As is commonly known, any inquiries into the
intimate relations of Soviet-bloc states have to deal with
the scarcity, and often the lack of accuracy, of data. This
fact can easily mislead the research process by keeping it
away from the hidden facets of the inner life of Eastern
Europe altered by the Soviet shadow. Romania's case is not
an exception. Its bold pursuit of its "own road to
socialism" was connected with a multitude of factors, each
5
of them having varying weight and significance. The
analysis of this phenomenon in its entire complexity is
far beyond the limits of the present study. This study
focuses instead on an analysis of the role of the RCP in
Romania's dissidence during the period, 1965-1985.
The study comprises three parts. The first part
presents Romania's historical background and a review of
literature regarding its position in the East European
context. The second part examines the internal
consolidation of power by the RCP and its value in enablin
Romania to expand the limits of autonomy. The last part
presents conclusions of Romania's dissidence based on
published opinions of others and on the personal thoughts of
the author.
PART I
ROMANIA IN THE EAST EUROPEAN CONTEXT
CHAPTER ONE
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Located in the Balkan region that for so many
centuries has been a battlefield of rival interests, Romania
has experienced a tortuous history of conquest and foreign
domination. The Romanians' odyssey was not a story of
building up a state according to their desire, but that of a
permanent fight against those who tried to enforce upon them
their will. Confronted so many times with so many different
enemies, Romanians learned very early to preserve their
national existence in different ways. In order to survive
they bent under the invaders' forces, obeyed their rules but
watched them closely, yielded and compromised to gain time
for achieving their goals. To employ these tactics
successfully, Romanian rulers of earlier times were
compelled to master an acrobatic diplomacy of tightrope
maneuvers--traits which have been inherited through time and
are very much alive today.
At the end of World War II, when the Soviet bloc was
4
formed, Romania did not have any choice other than to be a
part of this bloc. Its future was determined in October
1944, by a decision that concluded a private conversation in
the Kremlin between Stalin and Churchill that established
1
the delimitation of spheres of influence in Europe.
Even before World War II was over the country was
occupied by the Red Army and the Soviets had started to
exercise control over it. After the Paris Treaty (1947),
where the legitimacy of Romania's pro-communist government
was recognized, the country entered a phase of total
subordination to the Soviet Union. Following the abolition
of the monarchy (December, 1947) Romania signed a
twenty-year Friendship Treaty with the Soviet Union. During
that time the Soviets imposed upon the country a demand of
heavy payments for war damages caused by the Romanian army
in the first years of the war when it fought against the
Soviet Union. They forced the government to support the
cost of Soviet troops stationed in Romania, demanded the
rejection of the Marshall Plan intended to help the
country's economy, and isolated Romania from the West. As a
Soviet satellite the country was deterred by externally
imposed orders and limitations from using its natural
resources for its own development and was relegated to the
position of being a main supplier of food and raw materials
2
for the reconstruction of the Soviet economy. This
oppressive economic pattern proved to have a strong and
lasting effect upon Romania's later development; during the
1965-1975 decade Romania continued to be among the least
3
developed countries in Eastern Europe.
It was this feeling of anger against the tight
economic grip of the Soviet Union and a deep frustration
arising from discrimination among other satellites, that
paved the road of future changes. The long march for
independence started slowly after Stalin's death in 1953 and
continued with increasing intensity thereafter, especially
following the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Romanian
territory in 1958.
Faced by adverse geographical conditions (800 miles
of common borders with the Soviet Union), the country's
struggle for emancipation has reflected its traditional
style by combining defensive tactics with long-term
offensive strategy leavened by a proper timing of action.
Perfectly aware of its incapacity to confront the Soviet
Union directly, the RCP prepared the ground for its defiance
in two ways: first, it entered the international arena and
exploited some controversial ideological issues as an
umbrella for launching its effort of independence from the
Soviet Union. Second, it organized national support for its
position within the country by appealing to patriotic
sentiments and anti-Soviet feelings among the population.
The effect of this policy in the last two decades radically
changed the character of Romania's external relations,
7ensured a high degree of exposure in the international
arena, and alleviated to some extent the shadow of Soviet
domination.
The following is a summary presentation of Romania's
international behavior that reflects its deviation from the
Soviet line over the last twenty years:
1. The RCP refused to participate in any conference of
communist parties intended to discuss, criticize, condemn or
pass judgment upon the political line or conduct of any
national party.
2. Romania refused to sever its diplomatic relations with
Israel after the Arab-Israel war of 1967.
3. Unlike other countries from the Warsaw Pact, Romania
established diplomatic relations with West Germany in 1967.
4. Romania refused to participate in the military invasion
of Czechoslovakia in 1968, and vehemently condemned the
attack.
5. Romania joined the International Monetary Fund and
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development in
1972.
6. Romania was the first memeber of the Council for Mutual
Economic Assistance (CMEA) to obtain generalized trade
preferences from the European Economic Community (EEC) in
1973, and signed a trade agreement with the EEC in 1976.
7, Romania received from the United States most favored
nation trading status in 1975, and remains the only East
European country with trade-promotion offices operating in
the United States.
8. Romania was admitted to the nonaligned bloc of states in
1976.
9. Romania proposed and promoted the idea of reducing the
military forces in Europe, including those of both NATO and
the Warsaw Pact.
10. Romania refused to permit military maneuvers of the
Warsaw Pact on Romanian soil.
11. Romania decided upon a unilateral reduction in military
spending in 1978 and 1980, in contradiction with Warsaw Pact
goals.
12. Romania expressed dissatisfaction with Soviet
intervention in Afghanistan and did not participate in the
United Nations General Assembly vote on the issue in 1980.
13. Romania ignored the Socialist bloc boycott and sent a
Romanian sporting team to the Summer Olympic Games in Los
Angeles in 1984.
There are more examples during these years that can
confirm this course of deviation from the Soviet line in
Romania's foreign policy. However, these deviations were
not unlimited. Since a Soviet military intervention was
avoided, it is reasonable to suppose that during this time
Romania also learned to know and live within the limits of
its autonomy.
CHAPTER TWO
REVIEW OF LITERATURE
For almost four decades Eastern Europe has been
dominated by the Soviet Union. During that period of time
substantial changes occurred in Soviet-East European
relations, between East European countries themselves, and
bewteen Eastern Europe and the outside world. How these
changes have affected Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe and,
implicitly, Romania's new course will be presented in this
chapter in the view of different authors. Since their
opinions are related to many aspects of the problem and
cover different periods of time, for the purpose of this
study these views have been synthesized in three categories:
the first category (a) includes opinions about Eastern
Europe in general with references to Romania's case; the
second category (b) presents opinions about Romania's
economy, political structure, or its relations with the
Soviet Union; and the third category (c) concerns views
about Romania's independence vis-a-vis Soviet tolerance of
Romanian policies.
a. Calling the area "The forgotten region," Charles
Gati deplores the fact that the United States is no longer
committed to defending the cause of Eastern Europe as had
been stated in the past by John Foster Dulles and President
9
10
John F. Kennedy. Yet, Gati said, in spite of Soviet
domination and little Western support, Eastern Europe has
remained one of the most pro-Western regions in the world in
which recalcitrant regimes like those in Romania and
Yugoslavia struggle alone for their independence. "We have
rightly abandoned our provocative forward strategy toward
Eastern Europe, but have wrongly adopted a policy of
2
deliberate indifference."
Analyzing Eastern Europe after four decades of
existence the same author, in another article, emphasizes
the overwhelming Soviet influence in the area. Gati
characterizes the struggle of several East European regimes
as an attempt to achieve more "elbow room" rather than a
real independence. The subtle attempt of these regimes "to
move toward the West without appearing to move away from the
East, thus avoiding any Soviet provocation, confirms in
Gati's view "the most fundamental political fact of life in
the region: continued dependence on Soviet power for
3
survival."
Referring to Romania, Gati characterizes it as "the
4
Soviet bloc's leading maverick," that continues to irritate
the Soviets with its foreign initiatives, but remains
internally in a deep economic crisis. The effect of this
situation, he said, is that the country's long stand against
the Soviet Union "lost much of the attraction it might have
5
once from the other East European leadership." However, he
continues, for the Soviet Union itself the situation of the
region raises many questions as well; the main Soviet
dilemma is to choose between the alternatives of a "bloc
cohesion enforced by Soviet military power and economic
subsidies or a modicum of East European stability made
possible by Soviet tolerance of 'goulash communism,'
6
'national communism,' or some combination of the two,"
Although Soviet leaders have tried in recent times to follow
a middle course between bloc cohesion and political
stability, creating thereby a new type of Soviet-East
European relationship, "diversity is not independence and
7
tolerance is not liberty," according to Gati,
Referring to the same area, Roger E. Kanet notes
that, "since Stalin's death substantial changes in the
Soviet-East European relationship have occurred, although
8
the basic Soviet goal of control has remained constant."
Asserting that this control has, over time, become more
subtle and sophisticated as the Soviet Union has tried "to
9
integrate the region... more fully into the Soviet system,"
Kanet recognizes that the Soviet threat of using military
10
force in the area "still looms as a distinct possibility."
Sharing Charles Gati's view that for Western
scholarship the area represents a "forgotten region," he
notes that "one gets the impression that some of the
recent... analyses of Eastern European politics were
motivated far more by the availability of certain types of
data rather than by the desire to explain significant
12
1
political processes." Referring to Romania, he considers
that "although numerous articles have appeared on Romania's
autonomy with respect to the Soviet Union, not until
recently have more general monographic treatments of
12
Romanian foreign policy been published." Emphasizing that
in order to understand the foreign policies of East European
countries one should look closely upon their internal
policies, he recognizes that "far too little research has
been conducted to date on the relationship between domestic
13
and foreign policy in the European communist states."
Therefore, Kanet concludes, more research of this type is
needed in order to provide new data and comparative terms,
which will contribute to a better understanding of this
14
"underdeveloped area in political science."
Focusing his examination upon the same problem,
Ladis K. D. Kristof expresses his view that each East
European country represents an entity that should be
thoroughly studied on an individual basis before any
generalization is attempted. Unless basic knowledge of
these states is gained, any integrated scheme in the area
15
"is not a reflection of political realities." Mentioning
that in the Western view Eastern Europe was only an appendix
to Soviet studies, a fact which revealed very little about
the political individualities of these states, Kristof
states the case of Romania as an example whose political
16
science "is virtually still in diapers."
13
Consequently, he concludes that it would be inappropriate to
engage in comparative studies of East European countries
"before knowing something about the colors and basic
properties of the stones from which the mosaic is to be
17
assembled."
The same idea is supported by Vernon V. Aspaturian,
who notes that "for many years the area was homogenized into
an amorphous conglomerate collectively referred to as
18
'Eastern Europe.'" Acknowledging the difficulties of
political comparative studies in the region, he affirms that
"not enough basic research has been done on individual
19
countries to enable a great synthesizer to do the job."
Referring to national communism as an expression of
independence from Soviet control, Gordon Skilling affirms
that in Romania the issue was used to maintain domestically
methods and forms of Stalinism, including the cult of
personality. In his view national communism will continue
to remain a major feature in Eastern Europe's policy of
resistance against Soviet domination. While Soviet
hostility to national communism has not diminished, and the
Soviet Union remains ready to respond with force if
necessary, the author acknowledges that "there is very
little that the West can do to affect the future of Eastern
20
Europe in any decisive way."
Writing about Romania's position within the Soviet
bloc, Andrzej Korbonski emphasizes that starting in the
14
early 1960s Romania opposed Soviet pressure on economic
integration and labor specialization within the Council for
Mutual Economic Assistance, and shifted its external policy
to the West and the Third World in order further to trade
and obtain credits for its ambitious plan of multilateral
development. This external trade orientation, in conjuction
with the country's own resources, has led to a lesser degree
of dependence on the Soviet Union from an economic point of
21
view. However, Korbonski argues that in the international
arena, Romania's role was detrimental to Soviet interests:
"Romania's behavior in the Third World, and especially in
Africa was clearly in conflict with that of Moscow....The
same was true for Romania's activities at the various
22
international forums."
Referring to the ideological relationship with the
Soviet Union, the author affirms that while under
Gheorghiu-Dej the country was a docile Soviet satellite,
Ceausescu 's leadership since 1965 has drastically changed
this situation. If Romania's foreign policy in the last
fifteen years "could hardly have pleased the Kremlin,"
internally the regime's performance "has given Moscow
relatively little cause for complaint. It remains the most
23
tightly controlled polity in East Europe."
Assuming that Romania has firmly decided to defend
its sovereignty in the face of a Soviet military
intervention, Korbonski emphasizes that following the Soviet
15
intervention in Afghanistan "the odds against the use of
violence in East Europe obviously have dropped rather
24
sharply." However, he concludes that it seems that Moscow
has learned some lessons from the many crises and events
that have occurred in Eastern Europe in recent decades and
25
is trying to do "its best to avoid their repetition."
Writing about the changes that have taken place in
Eastern European alignment in the last two decades, Peter
Summerscale characterizes Romania's foreign policy as
remarkably consistent since the early 1960s. The RCP
leadership, he says, was able to consolidate its power by
identifying itself with national aspirations and by
promoting a policy of national economic development. This
policy ran counter to the interests of the Soviets who
attempted to integrate Romania's economy into a more
controlled process of development of the Socialist bloc as a
whole. The supranational planning and the international
division of labor that Khrushchev tried to impose in Eastern
Europe through CMEA were perceived as threats seeking to
maintain Romania's under-development and served "as [a]
26
catalyst for Romania's assertion of independence."
The first sign of an autonomous foreign policy,
Summerscale writes, was visible in the early 1960s when
Romania tried to mediate the Sino-Soviet dispute. Even
though the attempt failed, the Romanian leadership decided
to defend its position and preserve its independence within
the Socialist bloc. Conceived as a defensive measure, the
16
"Declaration of Independence" issued in April 1964, became
the theoretical basis for Romania's international policy
which has been maintained till the present despite the
Soviet Union's efforts to promote the unanimity principle.
The declaration emphasized the concepts of national
independence, sovereignty, equal rights, non-interference in
internal affairs and the principles of socialist
internationalism.
Describing Romania's foreign policy as "a series of
moves to test the limits of Soviet tolerance in the area of
27
foreign policy and its control of bloc affairs,"
Summerscale distinguishes certain conditions that have
enabled Romania to pursue such a policy. Among them he
notes the ties the country has established with the West as
well as its relations with China, Yugoslavia, and the
non-aligned states. These relations have contributed to
lessening Romania's dependence on the Soviet Union and have
28
increased its image of autonomy abroad.
Acknowldeging, that Ceausescu's personality cult and
his overriding nationalism are probably unpleasant to the
Soviet taste, Summerscale however considers that this fact
represents no direct threat to the Socialist camp's
cohesion. Subsequently, he therefore advances the idea that
the Soviets may come to understand the value of these
characteristics in maintaining Romania's internal orthodoxy.
"It may indeed well be that the Soviet Union's tolerance of
Romanian waywardness is influenced by an understanding of
17
the domestic basis on which 'autonomy' rests."2 9
Questioning whether Romania's pursuit of autonomy is
anything more than a means to legitimize the RCP's rule and
Ceausescu's own ascendance to power, Summerscale observes
that Romania's links with the West have produced very
limited benefits for Romanians who have the lowest living
standard in the Soviet bloc. Faced with popular discontent
and labor unrest, the regime has resorted to harsh measures
against any challenges to its authority, as was demonstrated
in the response to Paul Goma's dissident movement or the Jiu
Valley miners' strike in 1977. However, the author stresses
that "internal Romanian policies have been the object of
very limited interest in the Western world and have
attractei0 less attention than Romania's independent foreign
policy." This fact has been exploited by the regime by
"distracting foreign attention from some of the less happy
31
aspects of internal policy."
b. Robert L. Farlow, characterizes Romania as
being "among the most rigid and restrictive of communist
32
states, but...also among the most nationalistic." The
RCP, he says, has "an obsessive pursuit of two objectives:
33
economic development and political autonomy." The RCP
operates according to democratic centralism, but within its
structure political power is held by only one person,
Nicolae Ceausescu. This power is exercised in the context
of nationalistic appeals that emphasize the process of
18
"Romanianization." This combination of nationalism and an
autonomous foreign policy won popular support in the late
1960s, especially after Romania condemned the Soviet
invasion of Czechoslovakia. This support helped the RCP to
set its program of rapid industrialization aimed at
achieving a multilaterally developed society. The effect of
this policy was that "Romania achieved one of the highest
industrial growth rates in the world and one of the lowest
34
standards of living in Europe."
During the 1970s, as the problems of development
became more complex, Ceausescu intensified his campaign of
ideological mobilization in order to create the "new
socialist man." If in the beginning the populace
participated in the Party's domestic program, during the
mid-1970s the dissatisfaction with the RCP's internal policy
manifested itself in different forms of opposition beginning
with the political dissident movement led by Paul Goma and
culminating with the miners' strike in August 1977, in the
Jiu Valley. The regime, Farlow says, responded with a
"carrot and stick" tactic that enabled it to control the
situation, making concessions on secondary issues while
repressing firmly the challenges to its position. The
popular unrest that accompanied social changes during the
process of development in Romanian society indicate, in
Farlow's interpretation, that "Romanians are less willing to
postpone material gratifications for a future socialist
19
35
utopia."
Farlow concludes that Romania's foreign policy is a
"balancing act between cooperation and deviation," that has
permitted "not a permanent alignment, but a permanent
bargaining with shifting and overlapping coalitions," while
alleviating Soviet suspicions through the repressive
36
domestic policy.
Analyzing the development of Romanian nationalism,
George Schopflin underlines that under Ceausescu's
leadership Romania has reversed the Leninist line of
"national in form and socialist in content," into "socialist
37
in form and national in content." That means, the author
contends, that "Lenin is alive and well, and living upside
38
down in Bucharest." Schopflin considers that cultivation
of nationalism in Romania has clearly provided the communist
regime with a "measure of legitimacy as the defender of the
national interests and [has]...offered the leadership a more
effective means of mobilization than Marxist ideology alone
39
had proved to be." However, he stresses that nationalist
manifestations have been strictly controlled by the Party,
which appears to be well aware that traditional anti-Russian
feelings among the population could easily transform
Romanian nationalism into a dangerous hostility towards the
Soviet Union. Mentioning the era of de-Russification during
the early 1960s, Schopflin acknowledges that "it did little
or nothing to broaden the limits of liberalization," but
20
nonetheless it was an outlet of relief for the anger and
frustration which had accumulated during so many years of
40
Soviet oppression.
Asserting that Romanian nationalism has developed
not as an adaptation of Marxist-Leninist ideology, but
rather vice versa, Schopflin emphasizes that the Party can
easily manipulate the people's nationalist feelings in order
to deflect their struggle for better living conditions by
maintaining an atmosphere of persistent threat to the nation
from abroad. This practice, he concludes, "hardly makes
41
Romania a particularly agreeable society domestically."
Labeling Romania's present political order as
"dynastic socialism", Vladimir Tismaneanu stresses in his
article that its nature cannot be explained without taking
into consideration the personality of Nicolae Ceausescu, who
has "emasculated the institutional role of the RCP." He
characterizes Romanian socialism as a "combination of
42
neo-Stalinism at home and neo-Titoism abroad."
Describing Romania's new course as a gradual
assertion of national power, Cal Clark notes that until the
early 1960s Romania was considered the most docile Soviet
satellite. It changed its status through a "partial
alignment" that permitted the RCP to exercise an independent
foreign policy while remaining within the Soviet system.
Romania's distinctiveness, Clark says, is that
21
Gheorghiu-Dej, who was a loyal Stalinist, ultimately defied
the Soviet Union and opened the road for Romania's
43
semi-autonomous course."
The differences between Romania and the Soviet
Union, Clark remarks, began over economic policies, as
Romanians objected to Soviet attempts to increase CMEA
integration and division of socialist labor. Pursuing the
effort of modernization through a rapid process of
industrialization against Soviet will, the RCP has
established a steady expansion of its external trade with
the West. The deviation from the Soviet line became more
evident during the mid-1960s, when the RCP's "Declaration of
Independence" stressed the "right of sovereignty and
domestic autonomy and made it clear that these principles
44
should apply to Soviet-Romanian relations."
Under the leadership of Nicolae Ceausescu, Romania's
separate foreign policy became more accentuated and helped
to increase the RCP's domestic popularity and socialist
patriotism, although the internal situation remains
"orthodox and conservative." Despite the fact that
relations with the West and the Third World continue to
remain active, Clark observes that "Ceausescu apparently
realized that he had reached the limits of permissible
independence within the framework of bloc membership," and
that "Romania's ability to finance trade outside the bloc
45
became increasingly limited." This fact, Clark concludes,
22
can lead to a future retrenchment in Romania's external
policy.
Analyzing Romania's perspective of development in
the 1980s, Stephen Fischer-Galati remarks that the meaning
of Romania's economy, foreign policy, independence, or cult
of personality continue to be a matter on which scholars
differ. It is difficult to find answers to these problems
he says, first because Romania has a special position "in
the communist and non-communist worlds," and second, because
the Party's leadership has pursued a foreign policy that has
46
both conditioned and obscured internal realities.
Recognizing Romania's impressive record of
industrialization achieved during the last decades, Fischer-
Galati observes that its beneficial effect seems to be
undetectable in Romania's economy, which at the beginning of
the 1980s was "in disarray, plagued by shortages of raw
materials and hard currency, by enormous trade deficits,
47
inadequate food supplies and inflation." In
Fischer-Galati's view, the industrialization process was
used by Ceausescu to legitimize and consolidate his power,
vis-a- vis internal challenges and Soviet opposition to
Romania 's independent course. Adopting a "political
platform based on nationalism, communism and modernization,"
Ceausescu's actions were "eminently political" in their
character and as such they "have tended to ignore economic
48
realities." This fact would undermine Romania's resistance
23
to Soviet internal interference and would determine, in
Fischer-Galati's view, a greater economic dependence on the
Soviet Union during the present decade.
Examining Romania's external relations, Lawrence S.
Graham notes the necessity of interpreting its domestic
policy. Asserting that Ceausescu's leadership maintains
internally an orthodox Marxist-Leninist line, Graham
emphasizes the illusive nature of Romania's autonomy:
There was, in effect, a tacit trade-off between the two
countries: in exchange for Romania's willingness to
follow what was essentially a Soviet interpretation of
Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy and recognition of Soviet
supremacy in the Eastern bloc, the Soviet Union would
tolerate nationalistic rhetoric designed to create the
illusion of national autonomy and would accept the
Romanian desire to set its own internal development
policy, even to the point of expanding its economic
ties with the West.
And Graham continues,
So secure was the Soviet Union's position economically
in relation to Romania that multilateralization of
trading patterns and economic relationships did little
to change the fundamental reality of Romania's economic
dependency on the Soviet Union.49
This type of autonomy did little to improve the
standard of living for Romanians, Graham says, and socialist
reality should be separated from the official image of the
country promoted through propagandistic means. "Day-to-day
life is hard; working hours are long; conditions of work
are constraining; public transport in the major cities is
crowded... food and commodity items are limited and in short
50
supply."
24
Within this context, the author distinguishes a
number of anomalies that characterize contemporary Romanian
society. Among them he notes the opposition between
Marxist-Leninist ideology and religion, egalitarianism and
privileges, mass mobilization and elitism, collectivism and
personalism, the party's ideology and the authoritarian
practice of government. Romanian society which has survived
despite history's tremendous vicissitudes, appears in
51
Graham's view "difficult to penetrate and understand."
And yet, he concludes that "it is the continued cult of
close personal relations and contacts and intimacy that
gives to this people and this society a vitality and52
fascination that is worthy of admiration."
Analyzing Romania's situation in 1984, Trond Gilberg
begins his article by declaring that "the country is in the
midst of a societal crisis that threatens the very fiber of
53
the system." Among the factors responsible for the
current economic crisis, Gilberg identifies agriculture
plagued by inadequate funding, irrational planning,
insufficient numbers of qualified personnel and the lack of
technical equipment. These conditions produce a poor
agricultural performance, a fact directly manifested in
permanent food shortages. Industry, although in better
shape, has its own problems arising from waste, lack of
spare parts, sloppy work and corruption. The country
experiences severe energy crises that result in the
"periodic shut-off of electrical power both to industrial
25
and to residential quarters."54 In order to reduce
electrical consumption by the citizens, the government has
imposed drastic measures, especially during the winter
months. This policy is enforced by "roaming vigilante
squads whose members arrogantly and threateningly enter
55
private apartments to enforce compliance."
The situation is aggravated by the country's huge
foreign debt which "has necessitated periodic renegotiations
56
and payments rescheduling." These external credits that
were supposed to boost Romania's economy to a higher level
of performance have instead become, in Gilberg's view, a
major headache: "The policy of the RCP to reduce dependence
on the Soviet Union by orienting its economic life toward
the West thus has backfired, since many Western creditors
now have serious doubts about the reliability of Romania's
57
economic posture." By attempting to resolve its shortages
of raw materials and fuel with the help of the Arab states,
Romania has deepened its crisis since "these sources demand
58
payment in hard currency."
In Gilberg's view, the RCP's domestic policy over
the past three decades is responsible for all the internal
troubles that Romania experiences today. He acknowledges
that the country's proximity to the Soviet Union narrows
its options in foreign and economic policy, and some natural
calamities that have occurred in recent years were beyond
the Party's control. However, the main sources of the
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present societal crisis are the RCP's faulty policies
started by Gheorghiu-Dej and aggravated under Ceausescu's
leadership. Among the effects of these policies Gilberg
notes the state of agriculture, which has been almost
destroyed in order to force the industrialization process;
the extensive industrialization that failed to provide an
intensive development for the country; an excessive
centralization in planning and control; a permanent and
excessive Party interference in technical and managerial
matters, and a Byzantine personality cult.
Looking for solutions to these problems, Gilberg
thinks that radical changes in Romania are unlikely, since
they would imply a "drastic change in the political system,"
a change which would be "politically fatal to many of those
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now in power." Moreover, the Soviet leaders, even though
displeased "with the self-proclaimed maverick in Bucharest,
are not anxious to watch a process of reform that might
challenge the very foundation of power in a Warsaw Pact
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member elite."
Recognizing that the Romanian nation which has
survived against so many adverse odds may have hidden
resources undetectable by a Western observer, Gilberg
nevertheless emphasizes, that--faced with an increasing
domestic discontent--"Ceausescu must find out at what point
the advantages of an autonomist foreign policy are
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outweighed by its drawbacks." In Gilberg's view, there
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are two factors that threaten Romania's actual system:
First, the severity of the current economic crisis: "the
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larder is very nearly empty." Second, the existence of a
subculture of young but highly skilled people who are
disenchanted with political life in contemporary Romania.
Since they have the potential "to make or break the
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economy," they represent the major threat to Romania's
present elite. If the Romanian political order under
Ceausescu's leadership fails to incorporate these people
into its structure, Gilberg concludes that, "the crisis may
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indeed become fundamental."
c. Writing about Romania's foreign policy, Robert
L. Farlow characterizes it as a partial alignment. He
defines the term as,
A sub-type of foreign-policy behavior whose general
characteristics are, on the one hand, frequent
statements by a nation of its desire to remain within a
given alignment system and to cooperate with the other
members thereof and, on the other hand, only limited
cooperation with those members and frequent opposition
to the policies upon which they have agreed. 6 5
Analyzing the question of how Romania was able to avoid
Soviet military intervention in regard to its independent
course, Farlow distinguishes internal and external factors.
Among internal factors he notes the presence of a strong
sense of national identity achieved by the RCP's leadership
that made the Party "relatively immune to Soviet
manipulation;" a strong anti-Russian feeling among the
population that helped the Party in its policy of defending
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Romania's sovereignty, and the rapid growth of the country's
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economy that reached a self-sustaining development.
Regarding the international circumstances, Farlow
notes Romania's willingness to avail itself of all
opportunities created by the lessening of tension between
the communist and non-communist world due to the Soviet
Union's policy of promoting the principle of 'peaceful
coexistence.' This policy has produced an increased
"willingness of the Western powers, especially those in
Western Europe, to engage in economic, scientific and
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cultural exchanges with Communist states." This fact,
Farlow says, has offered to Romania "not only a justifi-
cation for, but also a concrete means of disengagement from,
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excessive dependence of Comecon countries." At the same
time, Farlow states that, "the Sino-Soviet dispute, [and]
the successful deviation of Yugoslavia and Albania... helped
both to divert Soviet attention from Eastern Europe and to
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limit Soviet leverage over that area."
The conflict between the Soviet Union and the East
European communist regimes that led to Soviet military
interventions are not based on ideological issues but only
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on the "control over the local communist party." This is
the opinion expressed by Christopher D. Jones, who
elaborates his position by identifying three tasks that a
communist leader, who is seeking autonomy from the Soviet
Union, should carry out. First, he needs to purge the party
of Muscovite elements and gain firm personal control over
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the Party, army, security organizations, and state and
economic bureaucracies. Second, he must secure his position
through diplomatic allies in the communist camp, in the West
and the Third World. Third, he should create a large
domestic popular support for his regime through nationalism
and societal development. Although he acknowledges that the
cultivation of nationalism can be a "risky enterprise" since
it may become an anti-communist revolt, like in Hungary in
1956, he considers that "Dubcek's most critical mistake in
1968 was his failure to take up the cause of Czechoslovak
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nationalism."
Soviet military intervention can be deterred, he
argues, by refusing to debate ideological issues with the
Soviets, focusing instead on national sovereignty. The
reason for doing so is that "a dispute over ideology... is a
private conflict between two communist parties; a dispute
over the right to national sovereignty makes the conflict a
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struggle between two nations." In this way the Party
leader would gain more popular support for countering
Russian imperialism than he could obtain on ideological
issues. Accordingly, he would force the Soviets "to make
war on his nation in order to obtain control of his party."
In Romania's case, Jones says, the party was purged
of the Muscovite elements and the leadership, in firm
control over the armed forces, presented to the Soviets a
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prospect of war in defense of Romania's sovereignty.
Autonomous communists, Jones concludes, are not seeking a
complete separation from Moscow, but only "the prerogatives
of independence": their foreign policy tends to be one of
nonalignment, and their ideology, adjusted to local
conditions stresses- as in Ceausescu's case- the value of
their view of Marxism to the cause of socialism.
Focusing in his article on Romania's independent
course, Graeme J. Gill distinguishes two stages of
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development. In the first, during the 1960s, the author
sees three interrelated factors which facilitated Romania's
new orientation. First, the Sino-Soviet rift that created
for Romania the opportunity for an increased ideological
maneuverability by taking a neutral stand in the dispute.
Second, the domestic development in the Soviet Union which
under Khrushchev's leadership started to promote a doctrine
of detente with the West, thus, creating for East European
states new chances for autonomy and ties with the West.
Third, the loosening of Soviet control in Eastern Europe
which permitted the RCP to appeal more strongly to national
aspirations, to arouse popular nationalism, and to exploit
the anti-Russian popular sentiments. These conditions,
Gill indicates, have created for Romania "a position more
independent of Moscow than that of any other state which
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remained openly aligned with the Soviet Union."
The second stage of development in Romania's
31
independent course has occurred, according to Gill, during
the mid-1970s. This stage, the author affirms, was
characterized by three main changes. First, Romania's
economic position became weaker than it had been during the
1960s, due mainly to the massive repayments of credits to
the West. This fact led to compromises with the CMEA and
subsequently weakened Romania's autonomous stand. Second,
relations with China had cooled significantly as China
improved its relations with the United States and entered
the United Nations. As a result Romania was deprived of a
basic partner in the communist world for counteracting
Soviet pressure. It was thus forced to "choose
reconciliation with Moscow, reverting to the position of a
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'neutral' in Sino-Soviet encounters." The third important
change was the Soviet Union's attitude of pursuing a policy
of detente with the West. Through a series of compromises
that accompanied this process, "Eastern Europe has been
reaffirmed as Moscow's backyard," diminishing considerably
Romania's chance of Western support in a possible conflict
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with the Soviet Union.
As the Soviets pursued increased Western trade and
capital, so did Romania. Furthermore, Soviet opposition to
Western ideas and attitudes inside their society was in
perfect accordance with Romania's policy, since "in internal
affairs Romania remains one of the most orthodox of
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communist states." Thus, Gill said, the Russians,
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ironically, "appropriated the course which the Romanians had
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been pursuing." However, he added, for Romania this meant
a closer position to the Soviet Union and a less independent
one.
Asserting that despite all these changes Romania's
position remained "largely unchanged," Gill concludes that
the country's chances of pursuing its independent course
without Soviet punishment are based on two factors that were
as important in the 1960s as they are today. First, the
popular support enjoyed by the RCP's leadership; and second,
the Soviet perception that Romania does not pose for them a
strategic or, "given the internal hard line taken by the
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Romanians, ideological threat."
Analyzing Romania's foreign policy, Robert R. King
contends that Romania's uniqueness resides in its avoidance
of Soviet military intervention vis-a-vis its expanded
autonomy from the Soviet Union, while remaining at the same
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time a full member of the Warsaw Pact. In his view the
origin of Romania's autonomy was the disagreement with the
Soviet Union regarding economic integration within the CMEA.
Since then Romania has expanded its autonomous foreign
policy but cautiously has related it constantly to
Marxist-Leninist principles and Romanian nationalism. The
highest point of Romania's defiance took place, King says,
in August 1968, when Ceausescu made his vehement
condemnation of the Soviet military invasion of
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Czechoslovakia. In his view, Romania's autonomy from the
Soviet Union was achieved not so much through internal
factors but by a skillful exploitation of favorable
international circumstances. Among them King identifies the
Western policies toward the East European states aimed at
supporting any move that would disintegrate Soviet
domination in the area, the Sino-Soviet conflict that
offered the mediation opportunity and permitted the RCP to
bargain for Soviet concessions, and the Yugoslav example
that presented a new alternative to replace the Soviet
relations of subordination with the Soviet Union.
These favorable conditions of the early 1960s
changed at the end of that decade and became "less helpful
to Romania's pursuit and maintenance of an autonomous
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foreign policy." As detente between the superpowers
registered more progress and China entered in the balance of
world powers, the significance of Romania's policy in the
international arena diminished considerably. King contends
that the evolution of security and detente in Europe,
represents a crucial factor in the country's future foreign
policy:
If detente in Europe progresses as the Romanians hope,
then their sphere for autonomous action vis-a-vis the
Soviet Union will be maintained if not expanded... if
Moscow's hope that European security will strengthen
its control are fulfilled, Romania will find itself in
a very difficult position.83
Analyzing Romanian foreign policy in the 1980s,
Ronald H. Linden underscores the linkages between
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international behavior and domestic policy. In his view,
Romania's foreign policy needs permanent internal and
external economic support and requires at the same time a
level of Soviet tolerance. He acknowledges that the
Romanian regime has learned from previous Soviet military
interventions that it cannot rely on any concrete Western
help; nor can it count on China's military support in the
event of an armed intervention. In this perspective a
continuation of the country's deviant foreign policy is
based entirely on "the leadership's ability to secure
economic and political support where it can and avoid or
prevent Soviet military intervention, rather than try to
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defeat such an intervention once begun."
Regarding the level of Soviet tolerance toward
Romania's foreign policy, Linden considers that it is
related to a variety of factors, such as the Soviet
perception of a political threat as in Hungary or
Czechoslovakia, the state of Sino-Soviet relations,
political stability in post-Tito Yogoslavia, Soviet economic
relations with the rest of the world, and internal political
development in the Soviet Union itself.
Asserting that the domestic economy which supports
Romania's international policy itself depends on economic
and political factors beyond its control, Linden concludes
that "the Romanians have had to learn the lessons, good or
bad, of interdependence" because the manner in which they
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will negotiate this matter "will determine the overall
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direction of Romania's foreign policy for this decade."
Writing about the chances of a military
confrontation between Romania and the Soviet Union in the
future, Stephen Fischer-Galati affirms:
Unless contemporary Soviet-American relations
deteriorate much further there is little likelihood of
military confrontation between Romania and its allies.
Nor is Russia likely to support a military coup against
Ceausescu unless conditions in Romania were to become
comparable to those prevailing in Hungary in 1956, in
Czechoslovakia in 1968, in Poland in 1980 or,
alternately, significant changes in Soviet policies
were to occur.86
Summing up, it can be stated that the consensus of
opinion expressed by the majority of the authors presented
in this chapter reveals the main issues concerning Romania's
past, present and future dissidence. First, it appears that
more research is needed at the individual state level in
Eastern Europe, in order to increase the amount of
information required for comparative studies or
generalizations. At the same time an emphasis should be
accorded to the relationship between domestic and foreign
policy which provides a better understanding of political
realities in each communist state.
Second, there seems to be little doubt in the
opinion of specialists in the field about the dominant role
played by the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe. It was
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stressed that although the methods of control have in time
become more subtle and sophisticated, the basic Soviet goal
of domination has remained unchanged. Diversity and
tolerance, however, cannot be substituted for independence
and liberty. Unfortunately, according to some views, the
struggle for independence of East European states has very
little chance of being helped by the West.
Third, while Romania's external policies may have
irritated the Soviets, it has also been characterized as one
of the most rigid and restrictive polities in Eastern
Europe. Its dissidence originated in economic reasons in
the early 1960s when the country refused to accept the
Soviet policy of supranational planning and international
economic integration through CMEA. In analyzing the
phenomenon, some authors have distinguished two stages of
development. In the first stage, which began in the early
1960s, Romania promoted a policy of national economic
development, achieved through a higher level of utilization
of its natural resources in conjunction with a reorientation
of its external policy to the West and the Third World in
order to obtain the credits and trade needed for the rapid
process of industrialization and modernization pursued
against the Soviet will. This economic rebelliousness was
supported ideologically by the "Declaration of Independence"
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which stressed the right of sovereignty and domestic
autonomy. During the same stage, taking advantage of its
role of mediator in the Sino-Soviet dispute, Romania
extended its relations with China, Yugoslavia, and other
non-aligned states. These circumstances contributed to
lessening the country's dependence on the Soviet Union and
created an image of autonomy abroad. The second stage,
which started during the mid-1970s, was characterized,
according to some views, by the negative impact of the world
economic crises upon Romania's economy. The economic
setback which forced the country into economic compromises
with CMEA, was accompanied by a changing process of
international circumstances that made Romania's arbitration
role in intra-communist quarrels less significant for
external affairs. Internally, the growing economic
difficulties have spurred popular dissatisfaction and labor
unrest. Trying to avert the situation, the RCP resorted
more often to nationalism which, in some opinions, is used
for diverting the people's attention from internal
conditions and for maintaining a Stalinist internal policy,
including the cult of personality.
Fourth, with one exception, the authors agree that
Romania's dissidence was genuine, although limited in its
manifestation. In fact these limitations, together with the
country's internal stability, were considered by the
majority of the authors as the major reasons for Soviet
tolerance toward Romania's deviant foreign policy.
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Characterized as partial alignment or semiautonomy,
Romania's dissidence was interpreted not as a desire of
separation from the Soviet bloc, but rather as an attempt to
obtain more room for maneuver within a permissible
framework. Soviet military intervention was avoided,
according to these views, not only by observing the limits
of tolerance imposed by bloc membership and by maintaining a
tight internal policy, but also because Romania centered its
foreign policy around the national sovereignty issue. In so
doing, it presented the Soviets with the prospect of a
national war in defense of the homeland.
Fifth, the authors unanimously express their views
that given the increasing difficulties that Romania's
economy has experienced since the mid-1970s, its ability to
maintain an independent foreign policy has become
increasingly limited. The struggle for survival, they said,
would lead the country closer to the Soviet Union and CMEA,
forcing it to reconcile its position within and with the
Soviet camp. This fact, in turn, would undermine not only
its economic independence but its ideological stand as well.
According to this view, Romania's example as a maverick of
the Soviet bloc will continue to lose its potential
attraction for imitation by other East European countries.
PARTY CONTROL IN ROMANIA
It has been hypothesized that a vital reason that
explains the absence of Soviet military intervention in
response to Romania's autonomous foreign policy has been the
latter's internal orthodoxy. The RCP has maintained overall
control of all social activities in Romania, a policy much
approved by the Soviet Union. Why has this policy met the
Soviet Union's approval? Largely because it included
features characteristic of the Soviet type of communism.
These include the following:
1. Tight internal control by the communist party over all
sectors of society, enabling the firm repression of any
challenge to its authority.
2. A single mass communist party which is authoritarian,
monolithic and strictly hierarchical, and which transforms
all other social organizations in means of implementation
its political decisions.
3. An absolute party leader who concentrates in his hands
the entire political power of the party and the state.
4. An ideology that justifies the party's leading role in
society.
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Part II of this study focuses on the examination of
these features. The analysis begins with the Party's
internal control, considered here as being the most
important element in deterring Soviet military intervention
in Romania. This position is based on the following
considerations:
a. For the Soviets, a single, authoritarian, communist
party led by a strong dictator is no guarantee of the
acceptance of Soviet leadership, as the examples of China
under Mao, Yugoslavia under Tito, and Albania under Hoxha
have shown. The Soviet Union has vehemently condemned all
these states for following a deviationist path, regardless
of the fact that their goals were communist.
b. Promoting a communist doctrine is not a sufficient
condition for passing the Soviet norms of acceptability if
the ideological position differs from that of the Soviet
Union.
c. Even supposing that the party follows the Soviet
ideological pattern, such theoretical adherence is still not
a sufficient guarantee for the Soviets. What will convince
them in this matter is the way a party applies in practice
what it professes in theory. In other words, the proof
resides in the character of the internal policies which
determine concrete and visible social effects. The closer
the similarities between these internal policies and those
existing in the Soviet Union, the better the chances for the
41
party to be accepted by the Soviets.
These criteria are generally valuable for every
communist state, and especially so for those in Eastern
Europe. The RCP's leadership realized that its questionable
foreign policy would not be tolerated by the Soviet Union
unless there was convincing evidence of loyalty to the
Soviet Union and the socialist camp. And what better
evidence could it offer than to emulate Soviet methods of
domestic control? Thus, for the RCP the condition for
remaining acceptable within the Soviet bloc while pursuing
an independent foreign policy was to enforce domestically a
rigid overall control. By complying with this main Soviet
demand, to which the other three factors were added, the RCP
was able to surround itself with a defensive line against
Soviet military sanctions. And, for two decades, it has
worked.
CHAPTER THREE
INTERNAL CONTROL
Party control in Romania is a phenomenon so
generalized and so conspicuously displayed that, almost
without exception, foreign observers characterize Romania as
the most tightly controlled polity in Eastern Europe. The
omnipresent character of this policy makes it impossible to
examine here all its forms of manifestation in Romanian
life. Therefore, the analysis will concentrate only on the
following political features:
a. Repression of dissidents;
b. Repression of workers' rights;
c. Cultural control and censorship; and,
d. Opposition to emigration.
a. Repression of dissidents.
Romanian tradition is not much inclined to violent
resistance or open rebelliousness against oppression and
domination. Rather than bursts of anger Romanians have
dealt in the past with foreign domination or local tyrants
by adopting a passive attitude and practices that corrupted
and undermined the exploitative authority. This approach
has also been followed under the communist regime, although
sporadic forms of opposition have occurred, especially
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during the first years of the communist dictatorship. These
acts of opposition were spontaneous and unorganized,
reflecting mostly workers' dissatisfaction with wages and
working conditions.
The intellectual dissent that first attracted
1
international attention occurred in Romania in 1977. At
the beginning of that year, a small group of Romanian
dissidents led by the writer Paul Goma wrote to the 35
nations that were to meet in Belgrade to review the results
of the 1975 Helsinki Conference, urging them to pursuade the
Romanian government to apply the provisions of the Helsinki
Agreement it had signed in 1975, and in particular the
so-called "Basket Three" provisions regarding human rights.
The main controversy centered around the
relationship between individual freedom and society's needs.
Individual rights apart from the collectivity were
interpreted by the Party as bourgeois-liberal democracy.
The dissidents adopted the position that the modernization
of society with corresponding improvements in material and
social conditions, should provide individual liberties.
They stressed that the Romanian constitution guaranteed
freedom of speech, of religion and of assembly, but only on
condition that they not harm socialist society. Citizens
are not allowed openly to question the correctness of
economic or political decisions or to refuse to participate
in the building of the socialist order. The dissidents did
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not reject socialism per se, but rather the limitation of
personal choices in the relationship of the individual to
the state.
When the document gained international attention,
the regime's reaction was to give its signatories exit visas
to leave the country, hoping thus to avoid an embarrassment
on the eve of the Belgrade Conference. Surprisingly, the
effect of this tactic was contrary to the government's
expectations. Paul Goma refused to leave the country, and
the document suddenly drew large popular support. Even
though some of the 150 signatories of the document were more
interested in getting permission to leave the country than
in human rights issues, Paul Goma became the symbol of the
human rights cause and refused to buy his literary
rehabilitation with his exit from the country. He continued
to receive messages of support from different parts of the
country, despite the fact that the Romanian press did not
2
print a single word about the dissent. The government
perhaps hoped to isolate the case and deter the diffusion of
dissident ideas to other parts of the country, thereby
avoiding the growth of the movement against the Party's
authority.
Less than two months after its open emergence in
Bucharest, the Romanian government crushed the dissident
group. Coma was arrested, and many of the signatories of
his document were interrogated, threatened and beaten by the
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security police. Released from prison after six weeks, Goma
refused to meet foreign journalists, kept a low profile and
3
finally left the country.
Like Sakharov in the Soviet Union, Goma considered
that a campaign for human rights had to be pursued from
inside rather than from outside the country. He refused,
like Sakharov, to compromise with the Party and remained
loyal to his convictions, However, his firm stand was
rapidly crushed by the regime's repressive actions. The RCP
could not affort to have an internal dissident group which
would call into question its capacity to keep internal
order, a condition that weighs so heavily in Soviet eyes.
The moment it became clear that the Party's tactic of buying
his silence had failed, the decision to crush the movement
was executed without delay. By forcing Goma to leave the
country and dismantling the dissident group, the RCP
restored "order", proving to the Soviets proof of its
ability to maintain firm internal control.
A different aspect of the Romanian dissent movement
was represented by the members of the Baptist Church who
accused the government of harassment and religious
discrimination. A document containing their major
complaints was read on Radio Free Europe in 1977. In
response, the regime promptly arrested the signatories of
the document, who were detained and beaten by the security
4
police. The RCP's attitude toward religion follows the
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same line as that of the Soviet Union: religious
institutions are perceived as potential havens for
opposition to the Party's authority. Consequently, they are
surrounded by permanent suspicions, are limited by
restrictive laws and are subject to constant police control
in order to prevent an anti-communist orientation. In
addition, religion and religious organizations are
manipulated by the government for the purpose of national
policy.
Following the Soviet Union's example, where
preferential treatment is given to the Russian Orthodox
Church (which has the largest religious group and is
associated with Russian nationalism), in Romania the
Orthodox Church benefits from similar treatment. The
explanation is first, that the Orthodox faith includes the
largest number of religious members among the Romanian
population, and second that the Romanian Orthodox Church,
unlike the Catholic Church in Poland, does not have the
moral authority of mobilizing national resistance against
the communist regime. Being more docile, and having
religious leaders willing to cooperate with the regime, the
Romanian Orthodox Church is better controlled by the Party
than is the Catholic Church in Poland. On the other hand,
the RCP is not willing to extend the same treatment to
smaller religious organizations such as Baptists,
Adventist-Reformists, or other religious groups. The reason
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for this is not only that they represent a religious
minority, but also because their congregations usually meet
in private places and their religious leaders are less
cooperative with the regime. The RCP is thereby deprived of
the possibility of controlling their activities.
However, when a dissident movement originates in
these smaller religious organizations, the Party cannot
repress it on religious grounds because Article 30 of the
Romanian Constitution:
guarantees all the inhabitants of the country the
liberty of having or not having a religious creed, the
religious cults being fully allowed to organize
themselves and function freely... The law forbids all
discrimination between the citizens of the country, on
religious grounds and punishes religious hatred and any
actions aiming at obstructing the free practice of
cults.5
So, the Party crushes dissident movements by resorting to
accusations that imply that the dissidents are in fact not
motivated by religious freedom but by greed and egotism.
They are also accused of being influenced by foreign
propaganda and of being engaged in subversive and espionage
actions against the country.
This style of dealing with dissident problems proves
again that Romania follows the same lines of internal
repression so characteristic of the Soviet method. By
advancing in this direction even the notion of freedom seems
to change its normal meaning; as one dissident put it, "to
stay out of jail is a very important kind of freedom for
6
anyone."
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b. Repression of workers' rights.
Socialist Romania has not experienced a massive
outburst of popular dissatisfaction or industrial
proletarian unrest, as did Poland. There are however, some
examples of open conflict between the workers and the RCP.
7
The miners' strike in the Jiu Valley in 1977 was one. The
event began in August 1977, in Lupeni, a mining community,
where miners blocked the mine entrance and displayed
publicly their discontent with the Party's policies, which
were blamed for the shortages of food and consumer goods,
and for inadequate housing and pension provisions. The
miners also protested against the penalties imposed for not
fulfilling production plans. The strike rapidly spread to
the entire coal mining area of the Jiu Valley, encompassing
several mines and involving about 35,000 miners. A petition
containing their demands was presented to Ceausescu who
arrived on the scene amidst a very tense situation. He
agreed to grant some of the miners' demands and made a
number of promises for satisfying them. For two weeks the
conditions were indeed improved. Then, in the beginning of
September, military troops were moved into the area and
plainclothes officers from the security police entered the
mines disguised as miners, in order to prevent and diffuse
any resumption of the strike. The leader of the strike was
seized by the security police and removed from the area. In
retaliation, up to 40 percent of the miners' August salaries
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was deducted for non-fulfillment of the production plan.
As usual, the government did not comment publicly
upon the event, and the press did not mention the strike at
all. The Party's policy was to isolate the event
immediately and cut off channels of communication and
contact with the area. It was thought that dissemination of
information about the strike carried a direct danger for the
RCP's internal control because other areas of the country
with smoldering popular discontent might become active
because of the miners' example. At the same time, Party's
activists throughout the country were instructed to minimize
the strike and downplay its significance whenever the
subject arose in public discussion.
First details of the event reached the outside world
months after it had occurred. The reaction of Romanian
officials to Western reports was first to deny it and then
to refuse comment. When Ceausescu visited the mining area
again on November 9, 1977, he did not make a single remark
about the strike in his speeches. The Romanian News Agency
reported instead that "Ceausescu was welcomed with
9
particular warmth, cheers and flowers."
Expressing the opinion that Ceausescu's position was
not much affected by the strike, one Western observer noted
that "he handled it very nimbly. He backed off where he had
10
to but otherwise clamped down." According to Amnesty
International's Group 113 in Chicago, "up to 4,000 miners
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were forcibly removed to labor and resettlement camps
throughout Romania after taking part in [the] strike in the
11
Jiu Valley in August 1977."
For a society that claims that its first priority is
to fulfill the needs of the people, the Jiu Valley strike
stands as an eloquent example of the enormous difference
between the RCP's propaganda and reality. The reasons for
the strike were nothing other than those very needs that the
Party had failed to provide to the people for so long. Many
of these needs were basic human needs. Instead of
satisfying them the Party's response was to arrest the
strike leaders, move military troops into the area, and
spread thousands of strikers to labor camps and forced
settlements elsewhere in Romania. It seems from this
example that no price is too high for the maintenance of the
Party's unchallenged authoritarian position. By acting
ruthlessly and swiftly against the miners, the Party gave an
unmistakable warning to other industrial workers that it
will not tolerate any form of opposition to its domestic
policies. And indeed there were some reports of prompt
police repression against railroad and metallurgical workers
who tried to voice their discontent in Bucharest and in
12
other parts of the country. The way the RCP has handled
. tse major conflicts with workers must surely have been
perceived with great satisfaction in Moscow. It certainly
must have enhanced the RCP's credit in Soviet eyes because
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it gave assurance that Romania would not permit the
development of a "Solidarity-type" movement that
subsequently so troubled the Soviets in Poland.
c. Cultural control and censorship.
In pursuing their socialist and communist goals,
communist systems must create a new communist culture which
will be used as an instrument in shaping the new society and
socialist individuals. Like other East European countries
which came under communist rule through imposed revolutions
under Russian occupation, Romania was forced to adopt
communism in its highly Russified Stalinist form. Although
the country's political and cultural heritages were
significantly different from Russia's, the Soviet model was
forcibly transplanted into Romania's life.
In the cultural realm this forced process of
assimilation has resulted in the restructuring of the entire
educational system after the Soviet model. The laws of
natural sciences were reinterpreted in the light of
dialectical materialism. Art and literature were "purified"
of bourgeois remnants and raised to the highest level of
socialist realism from which they could truly serve the
cause of communist society. A methodical attack was started
simultaneously against religious convictions and "decadent"
Western ideas of social behavior, which were considered to
be dangerous factors that undermined the process of
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creating the "new socialist man." It is noteworthy that one
of the goals of this process was to "free" people from their
attachment to nationalistic sentiments and to cultivate a
new attitude of socialist patriotism, meaning loyalty to the
cause of socialism and its leading "star", the Soviet Union.
It was not until the de-Stalinization era started
by Khrushchev in 1956, that new tendencies of diversity
started to challenge the rigid pattern of Russian communist
political culture. In order to make the social order more
acceptable to the masses and to increase at the same time
their legitimacy, the communist parties started to blend
elements of the national cultural heritage into the new
socialist culture such that it gave each communist culture a
mark of distinctiveness.
In Romania the process of enhancing socialist
culture with traditional values such as patriotism,
collectivism and sacrifice for remote national goals, was
accompanied by an effort to eliminate what was considered
the negative heritage of presocialist culture. Among the
condemned manifestations were national chauvinism, localism,
egotism, corruption and loose morals. At the same time
considering that Romania is a multiethnic society the
cultural elements of Hungarian and German origin were
absorbed into the new socialist culture. The result of this
process has been that the initial Russian model has been
transformed into a cultural amalgam that bears a national
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imprint.
However, the de-Stalinization campaign soon began to
reveal some unpredictable effects. The trend of
liberalization in art and literature in communist countries,
including the Soviet Union, tended to grow beyond the
control of the respective parties. Once the door for
criticism was opened the line between what was acceptable to
the regime and what was not, became very difficult to hold.
Criticism went so far that it challenged the legitimacy of
the RCP's social control, and demanded greater freedom for
cultural activity and the liberalization of art from
politics and ideological goals. Even more dangerous for
Party control was the solidarity among members of the
cultural intelligentsia:
Cultural circles and clubs... became centers of
independent literary, social, and ultimately political
initiative, which accelerated the disintegration of
party controls and which provided a common meeting
ground for those who wished to bring about real social
and political changes.13
Sensing the threat that this development could pose
to his political power, Khrushchev himself in 1962
reinforced Party control in the cultural realm and restored
the ideological limits of cultural expression. From that
time on, it became clear to the Soviet satellites that any
significant deviation from the Soviet line in this field
would lead to a confrontation with the Soviet Union. The
repression of the pluralistic tendencies of expression that
blossomed within the intellectual Czechoslovak movement in
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1968, proved the existence of the Soviet limits of
tolerance.
Learning from this lesson, the RCP's policy of
promoting a socialist culture heavily laden with Romanian
nationalism, was carefully balanced by close cultural
control. This trend became obvious in the summer of 1971
when Ceausescu, after a long trip to China and other Asian
communist countries, launched the so-called "mini-cultural
revolution." It was an integrated part of the ideological
and cultural offensive designed to raise political
consciousness and cultural awareness at the mass level. The
cultural program emphasized that art and literature should
take their inspiration from socialist ideals and base their
form of expression on Marxism-Leninist ideology, aiming to
raise the consciousness of the new man. It was the same
view that had guided Soviet literature and art from the time
that Khrushchev had expressed it:
Literature and art are part of the whole people's
struggle for communism... The highest social destiny of
art and literature is to mobilize the people to the
struggle for new advances in the building of communism.4
Ceausescu expresses it thus:
Literature is called upon to depict convincingly the
new human conditions in our society, the ideals.,. of
the new man... Literature should strengthen... the
superiority of the socialist system.15
The Party's cultural program calls upon the union of
writers, composers, plastic artists, film producers,
artists, literary and art critics to organize debates on the
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ideology and cultural policy of the RCP, to study the norms
and principles of Marxist ethics and esthetics, and to
16
promote work with a revolutionary and patriotic character.
It follows that in the Party's view art is not based on the
spontaneous and free inspiration of its creator; it has,
instead, a special meaning which justifies its submission to
political control.
The same ideas appear in the Soviet concept:
For the artist who truly wants to serve his people, the
question does not arise of whether he is free or not in
his creative work... the true representation of life
from the point of view of the Communist 'partiinost' is
a necessity of his soul. 1 7
So, for the creators of art the framework seems to be well
established by the Party's indications. Said Ceausescu:
"We do not need several philosophical concepts in Romania,
18
but only one: the historic and dialectic materialism."
This control and censorship imposed upon artistic
creation has totally blocked the channels of exchange for
new ideas in artistic expression and has threatened directly
the creators' artistic integrity. They have, out of
conviction or fear, to subordinate their work to the Party's
demand. The few who have had the courage to oppose directly
the cultural dogmatism of the Party and to complain against
its censorship have been harshly repressed, have been
accused of promoting elitism and have been excluded from
artistic unions. One of them, the writer Paul Goma, became
a central figure in the campaign for human rights.
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Trying to present its artistic control and
censorship in a democratic light, the Party has promoted the
idea of bringing artistic creation "down" to the masses.
"Theater performances are now often staged in factories and
offices, and workers and peasants sit on review boards that
19
examine the merits or demerits of books, plays and films."
But the party is watching not only what is produced
inside the country in the cultural field: it also decides
what the Romanian people should know regarding foreign
culture. According to the Party's directive, presenting
foreign culture will be in accordance with the Party's
principle of safe-guarding the socialist education of the
20
masses. This means, for example, that no subscription to
a cultural magazine or periodical from abroad is allowed
without the Party's approval; no book can be translated
into the Romanian language and no movie can be seen, without
a rigorous screening for anti-communist hints.
To have total control over the country's culture,
the Party has accorded an important role to the
participation of the masses. A national festival called
"Song to Romania," is organized every two years in the form
of a national artistic contest starting from the smallest
communes and villages up to the final stage in the country's
capital. Throughout, hundreds and thousands of amateur
artists, alone or in groups, sing or recite praises to the
Party and its leadership. From beginning to end, every
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stage of the festival is controlled and approved by the
Party: "Every field, down to the last commune and last
dance or cultural ensemble, must carry out its activities
under the direct leadership of party bodies and
21
organizations." The purpose of this mass culturalization
under strict Party supervision, is the final goal of
socialist culture, the creation of a new socialist man:
"The National Theater, the Romanian Opera House, and up to
the last cultural house in the remotest commune or village,
must become a revolutionary, patriotic center of shaping the
22
new man."
An important part in the development of the Romanian
socialist culture is played by the press, radio and
television which are also under total Party control and
censorship; "The press, radio and television should be an
efficient platform of our socialist democracy, to serve the
participation of the masses in debating the party's policy23
in the leading of society." Although in theory the mass
media are supposed to take a firm position against the
negative aspects from society's life, in reality no article
is printed in the local or national newspaper and no news is
transmitted on radio or television without the Party's
approval. And this approval will never come for subjects
such as dissidents, workers' revolts or popular
dissatisfactions that will damage the Party's image.
Through its levers of control and censorship the RCP
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has been able to shape in the last twenty years a socialist
culture whose lines of development have been similar to
those that have existed in the Soviet Union, except for the
nationalistic aspect. Romania's highly charged
nationalistic campaign can hardly be approved by the Soviets
if they are to maintain the unity of the Socialist camp.
However, since Romania has thus far avoided Soviet military
sanctions for its nationalistic overtones, some explanation
in support of the hypothesis of this study is necessary for
this particular aspect.
First, the nationalistic feelings in general and the
anti-Soviet resentment in particular have been strictly
controlled inside the country by the RCP. As the responses
to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and the
Soviet-Romanian territorial dispute over Bessarabia in 1976
have demonstrated, anti-Soviet feelings have been carefully
orchestrated by the RCP even though they might have
initially appeared naturally and spontaneously. They were
allowed to rise in intensity up to a level at which the
Party could obtain its desired popular support. After that,
anti-Soviet expressions were firmly framed and cooled and no
other revivals were permitted. Once the Party position was
backed by large popular support, the issue which stirred the
emotional uprising was removed from the front to the back
burner and revived only from time to time when the Party
needed a new boost of mass support for its policies.
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Second, the Soviets might understand Ceausescu's
political play with Romanian nationalism in maintaining the
Party's legitimacy. And since the RCP maintains Romania's
internal orthodoxy in part through appeals to nationalism,
the Soviets are willing to accept some overcharged
nationalistic manifestations, as long as they are under the
Party's control.
d. Opposition to emigration.
Following the Helsinki Agreement that emphasized the
issue of human rights, Romania's regime has experienced an
increased pressure from a large number of people who have
applied for exit visas to the West. This phenomenon has
reflected a massive manifestation of discontent with the
RCP's position on the issue, which has been interpreted by
the regime as the consequence of Western ideas that have
penetrated Romania's life and "polluted" its moral climate.
When human rights are used as a basis for emigration to the
West, the Party rejects the humanitarian aspect, claiming
that it is a Western tactic intended to undermine Romania's
socialist development by luring people abroad to an easy
life. Speaking about this problem at the Twelfth RCP
Congress, Ceausescu declared:
The party will be firm in its fight against the
chauvinist and nationalistic propaganda of reactionary
circles abroad, against the falsification of the
situation in our country, against the attempts to
mislead the working people of other nationalities. 2 4
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For Ceausescu, who strongly emphasizes the organic ties that
should exist between the individual and the society, the
desire for emigration is a condemnable act of immoral
behavior that endangers his personal historical mission:
"The issue of emigration probably appears to be limited to
treason or abandonment of the common nation- building
effort; in a way, abandoning 'the ship' is a form of 25
violation of the General Secretary's personal human rights."
Ceausescu has made clear that the Romanian
government will not permit any mass emigration and he has
disapproved of the tendency of individuals to look for
solutions to their problems outside the fatherland, instead
of solving them inside the country for the common benefit:
The place of our citizens regardless of their Romanian,
Hungarian, German or Jewish nationality is here, in the
common effort of all the people for building a truly
free and happy life in which everybody could enjoy the
socialist civilization.26
Mentioning that the party will continue to solve in a
humanitarian spirit the reunion of families, Ceausescu has
emphasized, nonetheless, that foreign propaganda initiated
to attract Romanian citizens from ethnic minorities,
especially Germans, has nothing in common with humanitarian
issues. To Ceausescu, such efforts represent the attempts
of big capitalist enterprises to obtain skilled labor for a
cheap price. "What kind of families' reunion is that in
which people lived in Romania for hundreds of years?," he
27
asked. To attempt to lure these people from their land in
61
which they were born and from the environment to which they
have adapted for so long a time, represents in his OpiniOn
28
"an act of inhumanitarian family disintegration." In his
view the problem of family reunion can be solved in a more
proper way by having the respective family members from
abroad, return to Romania. Thus, according to the Party's
view, there is no reason for Romanians to emigrate:
We do not encourage anyone under any form to leave
Romania. We ensure jobs and equal opportunities to all
of our citizens... Therefore there is no justification
whatsoever for anyone leaving his country to work
abroad. 29
The RCP's restrictive policy on emigration is
reflected not only in its statements but in its practice as
well. The process of issuing exit visas involves an
exasperating waiting time of two to three years during which
job discrimination, harassment and police interviews are
common practices. By promoting this policy the RCP is
totally in tune with the Soviet Union's position, where
hundreds of thousands of people, especially Jews, encounter
even worse treatment in response to their requests for exit
visas.
In conclusion, it may be reiterated that the RCP's
internal control is an undeniable reality proved by concrete
and visible political actions. The firm and harsh
repression against intellectual and religious dissent
movements reflect clearly that the RCP is not willing to
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accept any form of individual freedom that can challenge its
authority. The same repressive policy applied against
workers' discontent has demonstrated that the Party will not
tolerate any organized opposition that threatens the
maintenance of its domestic policies. In the cultural realm
the Party has totally subordinated Romanian culture to its
communist ideology and through censorship has culturally
isolated the country from the West. Finally, by opposing
emigration and ignoring the documents it signed at the
Helsinki Conference in 1975, the RCP proves its dictatorial
internal policy which disregards certain human rights.
All these facts demonstrate that the RCP holds a
firm and unchallenged domestic control and is totally
committed to the communist cause. This evidence represents
a line of strong defense against Soviet military sanctions.
Indeed, it is reasonable to assume that the Soviets will
think twice before deciding to invade the tightest polity of
their empire whose internal features resemble so much their
own society.
CHAPTER FOUR
THE PARTY
According to the Constitution, the leading power of
Romanian society is the RCP. Under Ceausescu this leading
political force has been strengthened, permeating all
aspects of the state and the society. This chapter examines
how the Party was able to accumulate such power and use it
as a deterrent against the Soviet military sanctions. Two
aspects will be analyzed in this regard:
a. Consolidation of the Party's internal organization.
b. Subordination of the state and social organizations to
the Party.
a. Consolidation of the Party's Internal Organization.
In order to maintain and enlarge its autonomous
foreign policy and at the same time to prevent Soviet
military sanctions for its external behavior, the RCP has
pursued two directions of development:
1. Increase its representative character by becoming a mass
organization, and
2. Consolidate its organizational unity.
The reasons behind these decisions were, first, to show the
Soviets that the RCP's decisions and actions represent
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the will of the Romanian people, and thus in any invasion
the Soviets will face national opposition. Second, by
strengthening its monolithic character the Party's aim was
to increase its authority as the leading political force in
society.
a~l. Consolidation of the Party's status as a mass
organization.
At the Ninth RCP Congress in 1965, the Party had 1.5
1
million members. During the next two decades this number2
uniformly increased, reaching 2.5 million in 1974, 2.9
3 4
million in 1979, and 3.5 million in 1984. A concerted
effort has been made to adjust the membership composition to
the structural changes that have occurred in Romanian
society. Thus, according to statistical data for 1984,
workers represented 55 percent of members compared with 44
percent in 1965, indicating the Party's intention of
maintaining its "working class" character. Peasants
represented 15 percent of the Party membership, the
intelligentsia formed 20 percent, and the remaining 10% is
formed by retired people, housewives, students and military
personnel. An increased membership has been registered for
women, who formed 32 percent of the Party compared with less
than 28 percent only four years before. An adequate ratio
has also been maintained in terms of ethnic composition: 90
percent Romanians, 7 percent Hungarians, .7 percent Germans;
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the remaining came from the other nationalities.
As Ceausescu has stated, maintaining a proper
composition of the Party membership will remain a permanent
objective for the future:
We must continue to pay particular attention to the
promotion of cadres from the working class, because it
is now the most numerous force of our nation... Greater
attention will have to be paid to the promotion of
women to positions of responsibility in all domains....
Particular attention has to be paid to the harmonious
blending of the work of elderly cadges with the elan
and enthusiasm of the young cadres.
Parallel with increasing its membership, the RCP has also
extended its territorial coverage. At the end of 1984,
Party organizations were present in each county,
municipality, town, and commune in Romania; there were 6,344
Party organizations led by committees in enterprises,
institutions and agricultural units, 72,735 basic
organizations, and 12,964 Party groups, "capable of
mobilizing communists and other working people to
7
commendably fulfill the Party decisions."
Consolidation of the Party's status as a mass
organization could not be accomplished without a large
number of qualified cadres, responsible for the selection
and recruitment of the new Party members. Therefore,
particular attention has been paid to the training of the
cadres. As a result, between 1974 and 1979 "nearly 43,000
activisgs have graduated from the party schools of various
level."
It appears clear from this policy that a twofold
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purpose was attempted to be achieved by the Party; first,
the broadening ofthe basis of its membership by attracting a
large number of people from all social categories in a
proportion that would give the Party a social structure
similar to that of Romanian society; and second, the
strengthening, on this basis, of the Party's identification
with the Romanian population at large. As was reported at
the Thirteenth RCP Congress in 1984, the Party's membership
included more than 22 percent of the total adult population,
and almost 33 percent of the total active population.
However, one aspect should be emphasized in this regard. If
the Party is indeed the vital center of the entire nation,
the highest echelon of the revolutionary force, "animating
all creative energies and harnessing the genius of the
entire Romanian people," then this should be reflected in
9
the quality of its membership. As society's vanguard
force, the Party's work should be very efficient. This
requires in turn a limited size and highly motivated
members. To keep up its prestige the Party needs to
maintain its membership standard at a high level;
membership should be a privilege and honor worth striving
for. Yet, the Party cannot escape the dilemma of increasing
its representative character by including a large number of
people, on one hand, and maintaining its proper size and
membership quality, on the other hand.
Undoubtedly, one result of facilitating admission to
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the Party was the entrance of numerous opportunists whose
conduct has directly affected the Party's revolutionary
standards. These concerns were clearly expressed by
Ceausescu when he criticized the attitude of "passivity and
lack of enthusiasm" spread among party members and
activists, and condemned the manifestations of
"bourgeois-landowner mentality, "emphasizing personal
material gain at the expense of the societal collectivity.
Thus, Ceausescu said, the further growth of Party membership
should be a selective process: "The high title of communist
should be awarded only to those who prove they know to fight
for the implementation of party's policy and who manifest a
11
revolutionary spirit." He stressed that the high title of
communist implies hard work and dedication: "Party
membership does not give any additional rights; on the
contrary, it means higher duties, boundless responsibility
12
and devotion in the implementation of party's policy."
To what extent this characterization accurately
depicts the 3.5 million members of the RCP remains a very
complicated question. What is clear, however, is that under
Ceausescu's leadership the RCP has achieved indeed a
significant numerical and territorial growth, advancing on
the road of becoming a mass party organization.
a.2 Consolidation of the Party's organizational unity.
In order to be able to pursue an autonomous foreign
68
policy in general, and to maintain a firm stand on the
issues related to the Soviet Union in particular, the RCP
has needed a united front of action. This vital objective
lay behind the Party's efforts in the last two decades
intended to consolidate its monolithic character. The
Party's basic organizational principle for serving this
scope is democratic centralism characterized by a rigid
hierarchy and centralization of power. Through it, the
Party's vast organizational network from the basic
territorial units up to the Central Committee is
interconnected in an operational system in which information
and commands are interchanged in an upward and downward flow
respectively. While in theory all party members are
entitled to participate in the decision making process, once
a decision is made the minority must subordinate its views
to those of the majority, and compliance is expected with
orders coming from the top.
The Central Committee in Bucharest, supervises
numerous interlocking committees and directorates at the
central level which are charged with the transmission and
implementation of the Party's decisions down to the last
organizational territorial unit from where the RCP activists
carry the messages to the general population. It becomes
clear that the Party's capacity for mass mobilization
depends directly on the efficiency with which this extended
organizational network operates on a daily basis. To
improve its performance, the Party's structure
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has undergone many changes, especially at the top levels.
Thus, at the National Conference of the RCP in July 1972,
the Central Committee was expanded from 165 to 185 full
13
members and from 115 to 135 alternate members. In order
to prevent "routine performance and promote constantly a new
revolutionary spirit of work," the Eleventh RCP Congress
14
held in 1974 made some structural modifications. It was
established that election to a Party committee would be
possible only for those candidates who had a certain length
of Party service and previous experience in a leading
organization. This principle, it has been said, would be
applied to all leading bodies of the Party from the top to
the bottom. Important changes have been introduced also at
the top Party level. It was decided that the Executive
Committee of the Central Committee would be called the
Executive Political Committee of the Central Committee
because "this name corresponds better to its role of leading
the entir 5 party activity between Central Committee
plenums." At the same time the RCP statute includes a new
provision concerning the creation by the Executive Political
Committee of a five-member Permanent Bureau whose task is to
lead current activity. In 1977, the Permanent Bureau was
enlarged to nine members.
Ceausescu has used these structural changes to
promote his relatives and close associates to top Party
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bodies thus increasing the concentration of power in his
hands. Although this tendency toward elitism has
accentuated the leadership's alienation from the rest of the
Party, an increased propagandistic effort has been made to
present it as an integrated part of a democratic political
structure. This aspect appears very obvious during the RCP
Congresses, which are held every five years. The entire
election process of the top organizations is carefully
orchestrated to be in accord with the principle of
democratic centralism. Each Party organization which elects
its delegates to the Party Congress is "assisted" by a
representative from a high ranking organization. The
purpose of this assistance is to ensure the election of the
"right" delegates to the next stage of the elective process.
The effect of this proceeding of successive selections is
that the quality of the final delegates that form the
Congress will virtually pose no threat of opposition to the
"election" of the new Party apparatus which is already
designed by the elite.
It appears clear then, why a rigorous discipline and
a strict hierarchical subordination imposed by the statute
represent vital issues for the Party's existence: through
them the external face of democracy is preserved, while the
possibilities of internal opposition to the leadership are
limited. This practice helped Ceausescu to consolidate his
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legitimacy within the Party; starting with the Tenth RCP
Congress held in 1969, he has been elected and reelected as
Secretary General at each successive Congress, not only by
the Central Committee (like the other First Secretaries in
Eastern Europe) but by a unanimous vote of the entire
Congress. Ceausescu has exploited these events by using
them as proof of the confidence which exists between the RCP
and its leadership. The message carried by these political
displays is to discourage any eventual Soviet attempt to use
internal Party discord to interfere in Romania's affairs.
4.2. Subordination of the State and Social Organizations to
to the Party.
In order to have total control over the country's
internal and external policies, the RCP has needed not only
to enlarge its representative character and strengthen its
organizational unity, but also to eliminate the competition
for power posed by other state and social organizations.
The subordination of the state to the Party was the
fundamental step made by Ceausescu in his ascendancy toward
absolute power in the country. At the same time the
elimination of the state-party dichotomy deprived the Soviet
Union of the possibility of exploiting the process of
struggle for power between the Party and the state, thus
safeguarding Romania's independent course.
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b.l. Party and the state.
At the National Conference of the RCP held on
December 6, 1967, Ceausescu presented a report for
16
territorial and administrative reorganization in Romania.
This proposal became the Administrative Reorganization Law
in February 1968 and replaced the Soviet model imposed in
Romania in 1950 with a new organizational system based on 39
counties as the basic territorial-administrative units. The
Party's justification for the reorganization was that it
sought decentralization and increased opportunities for mass
participation in local administration. What in fact was
realized through this reorganization, was a fusion of the
Party and state functions at the national level.
What Ceausescu had established at the top, after the
Conference in 1967--namely unifying in his person the head
of the Party and president of the state--was replicated down
along the lines of authority to sub-national levels.
Through this reorganization the Romanian government became
structurally parallel to the Party at each hierarchical
level. Party and state organs at the national level, such
as the Grand National Assembly and the Council of State,
were replicated at the local level in the form of People's
Councils and Executive Committees. In accordance with
Ceausescu's dual status as Secretary of the Party and
President of the Council of State, at the sub-national level
the president of the People's Council of each county became
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simultaneously the first secretary of the parallel local
Party organization.
A brief examination of state institutions and
subnational government might be helpful in understanding the
interlocking nature of the Party and the state in Romania.
i. State institutions.
Under the Romanian Constitution the main state
institution is the Grand National Assembly, defined as the
sole source of power in the Romanian government. It is a
unicameral body consisting of 465 deputies, elected every
five years. Second in importance is the Council of State, a
permanent legislative body of 22 members. Its head is the
President of the Republic, who has at his service a staff
organization called the Presidency of the Republic. Third,
and subordinated to the Council of State, is the Council of
Ministers, a policy-implementation body which directs state
administration and daily governmental operations. Its head
is the Prime Minister.
One of the basic characteristics of the state
administration is the principle of double subordination.
The dual character of the state and the Party organs begins
with the Council of State, which became by law an organ of
the Party and the state in 1969, and continues downward to
17
local administration. Here the practice of double
subordination means that all local administrative and
technical services provided by central governmental organs
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are subject to supervision and control exercised by people's
council officials, who are also top local Party personnel.
ii. Sub-national government.
Sub-national government, both in the state and the
Party, is organized around the territorial administrative
division. There are three levels of sub-national
government: counties, towns or cities, and communes.
People's councils are local administrative and
representative assemblies which are operating at all three
levels. As local organs of state power, they are charged
with organizing the citizens for participation in solving
state and public problems at the local level. As organs of
representation and administration at the same time, the
local people's councils are used by the RCP as an example of
Romania's internal democracy, by suggesting the direct
participation of masses in the policy making decisions.
Within the people's councils the fusion of political and
administrative activities appears more clearly than at the
national level. Whereas at the national level political
institutions are separated from the administrative ones, the
people's councils are housed in the same building with local
Party organizations, ensuring in this way a close
communication between Party and state administration
offices. Representatives to the people's councils, or
deputies, vary according to the population of the respective
territorial administrative unit: from an average of 200
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deputies at the county level to 50 in a commune. Each
council has a president and an executive committee. Local
problems are resolved by the permanent bureau, formed by the
president and a reduced number of high ranking officials.
The permanent bureau together with the Party bureau forms a
local political elite which is in fact the true government
at all three sub-national levels. Holding in his hands the
top state and Party positions, the president of the council
retains the absolute power which makes him the undisputed
local leader.
Thus, Ceausescu's style of leadership, reproduced
all over the country, has led to the creation of a
sub-national government system which relies on local elites
totally subordinated to the "leader" and ready to execute
and implement his decisions down to the last functional unit
in their area of control. The Party uses this system as an
efficient device in the process of transmission,
coordination, implementation and control of its decisions.
At the same time it enables the RCP to perform a quick
mobilization of the entire population if an event such as a
military invasion threatens the country's sovereignty. Such
a government system then, in which the state is subordinated
to the Party, can be interpreted as a defensive measure
taken by the Party for the protection of its autonomy
against the Soviet military threat.
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b.2. The Party and mass organizations:
For the RCP the coordination of mass organizations
is one of the fundamental principles of its internal policy.
Mass mobilization is a reflection of the Party's degree of
popular support and an indication of its ability to lead the
society toward socialist and communist goals. At the same
time mass organizations are used by the Party as
propagandistic means for cultivating patriotic sentiments
and commitment to defending the country's sovereignty.
There are practically dozens of mass organizations
designed for a large variety of interests in Romanian
society. Among them are: the Socialist Unity Front, the
Trade Union, the Union of Communist Youth, the Union of
Students' Associations, the National Women's Council, and
the Writers' Union.
The Socialist Unity Front is the largest mass
organization in the country and has the role of organizing
electoral campaigns for the National Assembly and the
People's Council at regional and local levels. According to
the Party's view, the organization's main effort should be
directed toward uniting "all the forces of our nation under
the leadership of the party for strengthening the socialist
18
system."
The Trade Union, which functions as a transmission
belt of command between the leadership and the workers, has
a significant importance for the Party since it encompasses
practically all the workers in the country. Membership
77
in the Trade Union is almost unavoidable, since a series of
work benefits such as health insurance, vacations, pension,
and housing, are directly related to this affiliation. An
important aspect in the organization's activity is the
existence of workers' councils and the self-management
concept. They are emphasized by the government as
mechanisms of democratic participation by workers in
management decisions. However, the leading role in these
councils belongs more to non-elected members (such as the
enterprise director, party secretary, chief accountant,
young communist league secretary) and less to
representatives elected by the workers.
In Romania, there are no national organizations to
voice workers' grievances and defend their interests other
than trade union organizations. Since "the attempt to form
an independent workers' union in Romania has faded under
government pressure," the workers must rely only upon their
19
local organization for the resolution of their problems.
General assemblies were supposed to be a means of affirming
workers' self-management and a place of debating and
resolving their needs. They are, in fact, symbolic
gatherings where the enterprise's director presents the
objectives of the production plan, the need for economies in
material, and makes references to work efficiency, to which
the Party secretary adds the necessity of raising the moral
and ethical values of the workers. Operating in this way
these meetings have created a sense of a lack of efficiency
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and have resulted in reduced worker interest and
participation.
Although the 1977 labor strife among miners in the
Jiu Valley was to have produced a new emphasis on self-
management and greater "democratization" of the workers'
councils, the rhetoric has not been followed by any real
20
decentralization. Constrained by the limited autonomy
imposed by the Party, the trade union organizations have
proved to be unable to solve the workers' daily problems.
Consequently, since the discontent remains, the Party will
continue to be confronted by a thorny relationship with the
class whose interests it allegedly represents.
The other mass organizations in the country are
under the same policy of subordination; the Party is
directly interested in increasing its political
socialization among youth, women, students, or other
professional organizations in order to align their
activities with its internal goals. The meaning of
"subordination", officially translated as guidance,
direction, and control, is greatly facilitated by the
Party's strict control and censorship over the entire flow
of information and communication within the country and with
the outside world. The process is also helped by the RCP's
practice of encouraging the development of watchdog bodies
and small "vigilante" units which, disguised as "public
awareness" or "voice of the public", gather information
about the character of social activities that take place
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within the mass organizations or social groups. These
watchdog practices combined with the tight social control
exercised by the regime's security apparatus, including
informants from inside the mass organizations, help the
Party to monitor very closely the social organizations'
activities. Finally Ceausescu's personal style,
characterized by frequent visits all over the country,
contributes directly to the subordination process of the
social organizations by creating the possibility of a direct
communication between the "leader" and the masses.
It can be said, in conclusion, that in the last two
decades the RCP has increasingly consolidated its position
in Romanian society by enlarging its representative
character, while maintaining a strict hierarchical structure
through which the state and other social organizations have
become totally subordinated to its leadership. Through this
policy the RCP has increased its defensive position of
autonomy not only by following the Soviet internal pattern
of practices and methods, but by presenting itself as a
strong leading organization with a united front of actions
and largely supported by the Romanian people. Through its
firm internal control the Party has sent a reassuring
message to the Soviets regarding Romania's internal
stability. However, at the same time the RCP has expressed
its commitment to preserve the country's sovereignty. By
using its domestic authority, the Party has presented to the
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Soviets a perspective of national opposition in the event Of
a military intervention in Romania. By consolidating its
leading role within Romanian society, the Party has thus
contributed to the avoidance of Soviet military
intervention.
CHAPTER FIVE
PARTY LEADERSHIP
For the last twenty years the RCP has been
identified with Nicolae Ceausescu. No analysis of the
Party's internal or external policy can be made without
taking into consideration his personality. He is the single
authority who dictates the Party's internal policies and he
is the sole representative of the RCP in its international
relations. To such a degree has Ceausescu neutralized the
institutional role of the Party that it can be fairly
asserted that the character of Romania's dissidence against
the Soviet Union in the last twenty years is a direct
reflection of Ceausescu's personal political behavior.
Since his name has become synonymous with that of the Party,
Ceausescu represents the key to understanding how Romania
has been able to avoid a Soviet military intervention in
response to its autonomous external policy. Further, it
seems normal to focus the analysis upon him since it was his
line of foreign policy which created this kind of threat in
the first place. Based on these considerations, this
chapter will examine Ceausescu's ascendancy to absolute
power and the significance of his role in avoiding a
military confrontation with the Soviet Union.
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In March, 1965, at the age of 47, Nicolae Ceausescu
succeeded Gheorghiu-Dej as the leader of the Romanian
Workers' Party. He was Gheorghiu-Dej's chosen successor, a
choice expressed by the former before his death on March 5,
1965. Even though he had been Secretary of the Central
Committee of the Party since 1954, Ceausescu was relatively
obscure and unknown. The other two members of the
triumvirate of power immediately after Gheorghiu-Dej's death
were representatives of the old guard: Chivu Stoica, the
President of the State, and Ion Gheorghe Maurer, the Prime
Minister.
Eager to establish his authority, Ceausescu launched
himself into a dynamic campaign of popularity throughout the
country with numerous public appearances and a series of
speeches. During the four months that preceded the Ninth
RCP Congress held in July 1965, he projected himself as a
symbol of a new era in Romania's life, addressing patriotic
calls for national unity under the Party's leadership.
The Ninth RCP Congress confirmed the new leader of
the Romanian ruling team. At the rostrum of the Congress,
Ceausescu alone received standing ovations from thousand of
delegates and foreign guests, while the other comrades from
the Party's highest echelon remained respectfully in the
background. At Gheorghiu-Dej's graveside, Ceausescu had
eulogized his mentor's memory and promised to keep his
policies unchanged. Four months later, Western observers--
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allowed for the first time to attend a Party Congress--were
surprised that after one minute of silence for
Gheorghiu-Dej's memory, the Congress simply forgot the
Party's previous leader. It seemed like "he had been in his
grave for four decades instead of four months."
From the very beginning Ceausescu showed clearly
that he was unwilling to share the supreme leadership with
anybody else, dead or alive. From 1965 to 1967, preoccupied
with the consolidation of his power he continued his
campaign across the country with an "image-building" effort
deliberately aimed at projecting himself as a young national
leader, full of energy and dynamism, endowed with innovative
ideas, and sincerely devoted to Romania's development.
Consequently, his popularity grew constantly; if in 1966
other party speakers referred to him only occasionally, by
mid-1967 almost every Party or government official did so
2
constantly.
Although collective leadership remained officially
the Party's style of work, Ceausescu's efforts at increasing
his personal control over the Party continued constantly.
The main battle took place within the Standing Presidium
which, despite its united front regarding Romanian
nationalism and resistance to Soviet domination, was
nevertheless divided into factions engaged in a struggle for
power. These factions were formed by party veterans
gathered84
gathered around Chivu Stoica and Gheorghe Apostol, older
party intelligentsia centered around Premier Ion Gheorghe
Maurer, and the new technocratic generation represented by
Nicolae Ceausescu.
To shift the balance of power in his favor,
Ceausescu persuaded the Central Committee plenum held in
June 1966, to enlarge the Standing Presidium from seven to
nine members, promoting in this way two of his close
collaborators (Tie Verdet and Paul Niculescu Mizil) into
top party positions. These two political "lieutenants" lost
no time in monitoring all levers of power at their disposal
to clear the way for Ceausescu's ascendancy. To counteract
the spirit of the Gheorghiu-Dej era, a large number of party
secretaries were replaced in the provinces and, through
successive shufflings, many important officials were removed
3
from state and party positions.
At the National Party Conference held in December
1967, Ceausescu replaced Chivu Stoica as President of the
Council of State and thus held both the top position of the
Party and that of the state. With Premier Maurer at his
side, and two of his rivals from the old guard, Gheorghe
Apostol and Emil Bodnaras demoted, Ceausescu's control over
the Party appeared to be very strong at the beginning of
4
1968. The quickness with which Ceausescu strengthened his
grip on the party leadership by promoting his men at the
expense of older party members arose from two pressing
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reasons: first, to consolidate his own position of power
within the Party and, second to deter the Soviet Union's
attempts at interference in the Party's internal affairs by
using pro-Soviet elements. Since some of the old guard had
been trained in the Soviet Union during World War II and had
continued to maintain an attitude of loyalty toward the
Soviets, Ceausescu perceived their presence in the Party's
highest echelon as a direct threat to his personal authority
and the Party's autonomy. His suspicions appeared to be
confirmed by some evidence that a plot was hatched against
his leadership by the Soviet Union, allegedly with the
willing collaboration of some top party members belonging to
5
the old guard. By eliminating these elements from the
Party's top positions, Ceausescu prevented Soviet
manipulations within the RCP and deprived the USSR of the
pretext of "intervention by invitation", to curtail
Romania's autonomy.
When the Warsaw Pact troops entered Czechoslovakia
in 1968, Ceausescu vehemently condemned the invasion and
called on the intervening forces to withdraw from
Czechoslovak territory. Speaking to a rally of 100,000
people in Bucharest, he emphasized that "the entire Romanian
people will not allow anybody to violate the territory of
6
our homeland." Whatever Soviet intentions may have been at
that time, the Romanian population perceived the danger of
Soviet occupation and Ceausescu received the credit for
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saving the country. Using this increased status of
popularity and support he continued to concentrate more
power in his hands, transforming the collective leadership
concept into an empty notion.
At the Tenth RCP Congress held in 1969, Ceausescu's
supremacy in the Party leadership was ostensibly displayed:
every speaker started and ended his remarks with praises to
the "leader." No allusions were made to the era that
preceded the Ninth RCP Congress. Socialism, it seemed, had
come to Romania only with Ceausescu's leadership. In fact,
after the Congress only two members from the Gheorghiu-Dej
era remained in the Standing Presidium: Ion Gheorghe Maurer
7
and Emil Bodnaras.
Thus, during Ceausescu's first four years in power
the composition of the supreme policy-making party organs
became almost entirely committed to him. From that time on
he virtually assumed the leadership of every significant
Party and state institution: Commander-in-Chief of the
Armed Forces (1969), Chairman of the Supreme Council of
Economic and Social Development (1973), and President of the
Republic (1974). He increased his grip over the Party
through its internal reorganization and the creation of new
organs which would facilitate his personal control. For
example, the Standing Presidium which represented the
Party's highest elite, was replaced by the Permanent Bureau
in 1974. Depending on the number of relatives or close
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associates promoted by Ceausescu within this elite, the
Permanent Bureau has changed its size: starting with five
members in 1974, it was enlarged to nine members in 1977,
increased to fifteen in 1979, and reduced again to eight
members in 1984. This practice of dispensing great
political favors to his numerous family and close associates
has led, especially in recent years, to the transformation
of Ceausescu's leadership into a "dynastic socialism."
The campaign of glorification of Ceausescu's
personality and his contribution to every aspect of Romanian
life was steadfastly developed during these years. A well-
directed propaganda system presented Ceausescu as a Party
symbol, a creative interpreter of Marxist-Leninist
teachings, a leader who initiated all major events in
Romanian society. His daily activity continues to be
publicized on the front pages of every newspaper in the
country. The evening television news begins usually with
videotapes of his current activities. Direct transmissions
or videotapes are provided by the television for each of his
numerous trips abroad. He is described by the media only in
superlative terms: he is "the most brilliant son of the
Romanian nation, the leader who crowns a succession of great
8
statesmen of our lineage."
Ceausescu himself feels that his role is a
historical necessity. Using Marx's metaphor, 'A violinist
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plays by himself, an orchestra needs a conductor,' he has
concluded that the development of modern societies in
general, and of socialist societies in particular, needs the
existence of "a multilateral conductor with multiple
9
qualities and knowledge." Asserting that in today's
society there are many conductors at different levels of
social organization, he believes that "all these conductors
have to act in a unitary manner, based on a single, central
10
leadership and guidance."
For protecting this central leadership, Ceausescu
has surrounded himself with a circle of relatives and close
collaborators. For preventing the formation of rival
centers of power within the Party, he practices a frequent
rotation of cadres. Ceausescu justifies this rotation,
which does not include his position, as a remedy against the
party's ossification: "we must firmly implement... the
rotation of cadres, their appointment from one job to
another so as to enrich their experience and enlarge their
horizon to strengthen the innovating, revolutionary spirit
11
of the entire Party."
As the chief creator of Romania's dissidence in the
last twenty years, Ceausescu has been at the same time its
main defender against Soviet military intervention. His
defensive policy was based first, on his absolutist
leadership which has remained unchallenged in the last
twenty years. Through it, Ceausescu was able to eliminate
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any factions and tendencies of opposition within the RCP,
thereby presenting the Soviets with a united front of action
and with no choices for undermining Romania's external
policy from within (the party).
Second, by maintaining a strict domestic orthodoxy
he has proved to the Soviets that he has the personal
capacity for total control of Romania's society. This
control has provided the assurance of his commitment for the
emulation of Soviet communism. This fact has undoubtedly
contributed to the lessening of the Soviet military threat,
enlarging at the same time Ceausescu's freedom in the
international arena. Third, Romania's autonomous foreign
policy of the last two decades has attracted international
attention to Ceausescu's personality. Presenting this
policy as an expression of peace and international
cooperation, Ceausescu has made it difficult for the Soviets
to find an acceptable justification for sanctioning Romania.
CHAPTER SIX
PARTY IDEOLOGY
Romania's internal policy and its external behavior
are directly related to the RCP's ideology. This chapter
will examine how this ideology justifies the RCP's leading
role in society, and implicitly protects Romania's autonomy
against Soviet military intervention.
For the last two decades, ideology in Romania has
been unmistakably marked by Ceausescu's philosophy. His
personal views about Romanian society and the direction in
which it should develop have led to the creation of an
ideology which is a mixture between Marxist-Leninist
principles interpreted in a personalized view, and ideas of
Romanian nationalism. This theoret cal amalgam that has
come to be known as "Ceausescuism," has been used as the
basic doctrine for political education and indoctrination of
the general population.
This theory comprises a series of basic coordinates
for political education and is centered around Ceausescu's
conviction that the historical task of achieving
socialism and communism is unconceivable without a
communist party that would lead the process of creating a
new socialist man. This basic philosophical concept
appears clearly in all his speeches dedicated to
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Political education. First, the Party: "Our party presents
itself... more united than ever and determined to... fulfill
its historic mission as [the] leading political force of the
2
Romanian people along the path toward communism." And
again: "Our firm progress is the result of the activity
of... all the people, closely united around the party, which
3
is the leading political force of our socialist nation."
The purpose of the Party's leading role is "The molding of
the new man, the purposeful builder of the social system,
[which] is the greatest and most complex task, the loftiest
responsibility and the new revolutionary duty of honor of
4
our communist party."
To achieve this complex task the Party has laid
constant stress on ideological and political instruction.
An example is the ideological program drawn up by the
Ideological Commission of the Central Committee of the RCP,
5
"under [the] direct guidance of Comrade Ceausescu." The
program was aimed at increasing the socialist consciousness
of the people, raising their level of political knowledge,
and popularizing the principles of socialist and communist
ethics and equity. This vast instructional program was
conceived for a three-year period of study, in the form of
seminars, lectures or debates organized once per month for
the entire population. For party members and young
communists the political training was to be organized
within their organizations; for the rest of the
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people the instructional program was supervised by the mass
organizations under the Party's guidance.
In order to be adapted to the different levels of
knowledge, of the people, the program was structured in
stages of complexity, starting with introductory lessons and
continuing with more advanced studies. The areas presented
or debated in political courses comprised subjects such as:
the history of the RCP, the philosophical conception of
dialectical and historical materialism, and Marxism as
interpreted by Ceausescu's creative thinking. The
political-ideological education also became an integral part
of curricula in schools and universities and was extended
even to preschool children. To facilitate the application
of the program, it was established that in each county,
town, commune, enterprise and institution political
education councils would be created under the leadership of
Party organizations.
Since the essence of the ideology is the Party's
leading role in all aspects of the society, special
attention has been accorded to the manner in which the Party
leaders from central and local levels integrate the
requirements of the political-educational program into
their daily duties. For a close supervision of this aspect,
Ceausescu has made frequent visits all over the country
during which he has criticized the negative
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attitudes manifested among leading cadres of the Party and
state in regard to the application of the program. He has
emphasized that in most cases only a small number of
individuals, usually those belonging to the councils of
political education, were practically involved in political
educational work; the majority of the leading cadres, he
observed, have been preoccupied with their managerial and
technical functions, remaining outside the political
process. For Ceausescu, this is not acceptable. In his
view, all leading positions no matter in what field of
activity, are first political positions. Thus, those who
hold these positions are first political leaders and then
managers, technical supervisors or other economic or social
functionaries. Accordingly, as political leaders their duty
is to ensure at their working place a permanent fusion
between the political function and all other activities in
which they are engaged.
To correct this widespread tendency of separatism,
an intensive recycling program was organized for updating
the political-educational level of a large number of leading
cadres. At the same time the rotation of cadres between
administrative positions and party functions, and between
central and local levels was increased. It was expected
that through these measures the leading cadres could
assimilate to a greater degree the necessity of fusion
between political and administrative functions, and
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understand better the meaning of the Party's decisions by
examining them from a different perspective. Summing Up
this point of view Ceausescu affirmed that the "Party and
state cadres must be good professionals, but at the same
time they must be good revolutionaries." A leader, in
Ceausescu's concept, cannot merely "be a good engineer,
worker, economist or even a good minister;" he should first
6
be "a professional revolutionary."
In conjunction with their higher ideological level
and political consciousness, the RCP's leading cadres are
expected also to be examples of socialist ethic and
morality. Only qualities such as honesty, hard work,
patriotism and devotion to the socialization effort can
enable them to attain the moral leadership required for
inducing into the masses the Party's higher aspirations of
7
creating the new superior man.
However, the requirement for performance and conduct
expected from the leading political cadres covers only one
area, albeit a major one, of the political-ideological
offensive launched by the RCP. Political indoctrination is
pursued with great intensity at all levels of society,
especially those involving large public audiences. For
example, special attention is accorded to artistic and
technical intelligentsia, who are considered as major
factors in implementing the party's ideological program.
95
"Good" literature, for example, could represent an important
source of inspiration to the masses for the cultivation of
the higher humanistic qualities that characterize the new
socialist man. At the same time "correct" movies or
playwrights could help the Party's political educational
activity by spreading inspirational messages or presenting
the RCP's program in a more appealing and emotional
expression.
Social and political scientists were called on to
emphasize the relationship between the Party and the masses,
and stress in their work the historical past of the RCP, its
revolutionary struggle and sacrifices that led to the
victory of socialism in Romania. It was recommended that
their publications and research should enhance the image of
d t socialist order, raise patriotic feelings among the
population, and emphasize the organic ties and continuity
between Romania's past and present.
A special role for the transmission of the Party's
ideological values was assigned to the technical
intelligentsia. Such an emphasis has been determined by the
increased development of technical education required by
Romania's economic needs. Since it has attracted a large
participation, especially youth, technical education has
been seen as an effective mechanism for political
indoctrination. This task has been carried out by compelling
the technical intelligentsia to perform the double role of
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transmitting technical information and ideological messages
at the same time. The purpose of this request is to create
among the students a perception of unity between "political
8
education and the 'real stuff'."
The revolutionary character of Marxism, in the
Party's view, resides precisely in the fact that it is
constantly enriched with the scientific conclusions of
social development. It is not a dogma of immutable theses
given once and for ever, but a scientific conception.
Socialism and communism, Ceausescu asserts, cannot be built
"based on a single license, the way they do it in
9
technology." To find the right solutions for every day
problems of life, it is necessary that politicians,
scientists, and thinkers should together analyze the social
development of the country relying on scientific conceptions
of Marxism-Leninism and on the ideas of dialectical and
historical materialism.
It is this view of a unitary effort carried out
under Party leadership which motivates Ceausescu's
ideological campaigns all over the country, in which he
consistently criticizes retrograde attitudes of
sectarianism, technocratism, and bureaucratic stiffness.
Theoretical activity, based on Marxist-Leninist conceptions
and enriched permanently by the investigation of the
realities of contemporary progress, gives the RCP a clear
image of society's evolution; it helps the Party to
establish a political line of action for every developmental
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stage of building the new system. The leading role of the
Party, Ceausescu stresses, is not a goal by itself. The
purpose of its work is to create in every socialist
collectivity an ideological and moral framework within which
people would develop their ability to live and work in a
collective spirit and consciously participate in the
accomplishment of socialist goals. Speaking about socialist
society, Ceausescu emphasizes its organic character: "The
society we are building is the society of working people, it
10
relies directly on all its members' creative work." There
is a close relationship between the citizens and the
society. There are no separate needs between individuals
and the collectivity. Consequently, there can be no private
sectors or specific activities outside the societal
collectivity. Since socialism is the purpose of society,
everything inside it should be viewed as a political matter.
The attitude of the people must be in conformity with the
society's needs; that is, there must be active and conscious
participation. No one is allowed to stay outside the working
stream or only contemplate the working process.
The party's leading role is a common feature of all
communist political systems. Through the party's activity
it is expected that socialist practices, methods and
attitudes would be implemented and assimilated within the
society, while socialist and communist goals would be
accepted by the general population. In Ceausescu's ideology
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the masses are expected not only to accept the new system
but to participate consciously in building it. Ceausescu
expects from all people a total adherence to the socialist
system and does not accept the thesis that consciousness has
a tendency of lagging behind material life:
The deficiencies existing in the ideological,
political and cultural-educative activity, the negative
phenomena emerging in social life, in the behavior of
some people can be often explained by the thesis about
consciousness lagging behind the development of
material life. To accept such a justification of our
drawbacks means to encourage a passive, defeatist
attitude with profoundly negative consequences on
society's development. 11
To think correctly is not enough, the people must also act
correctly to implement the Party's policy. A "correct"
action is emphasized as opposed to a participation motivated
by spontaneous impulses. Mass spontaneity is not supported
by the Party; it leads only to satisfaction of immediate
demands losing sight of the cardinal goals of the
revolutionary movement.
In Ceausescu's ideology the people's participation
should take the form of a high degree of mobilization under
the Party's guidance because the Party is better equipped
than the masses to follow correctly the "inevitable road"
already revealed by Marxist-Leninist teaching. This is
then, the core of Ceausescu's ideology which motivates the
necessity of the Party's leadership in society. His
argument is presented not as personal desire but as a
logical succession of phases imposed by historical
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necessity, Basically he maintains that socialism and
communism are the highest forms of human society. If
socialism is what society needs then its citizens, who form
it, could not but have the same needs. Based on these
integrally related needs and interests there can be no other
direction of development but socialism. As the political
goal of society, its print is marked on everything in the
society. Political aspects cannot be separated from other
activities, nor ignored. They are blended at every social
level with other factors, even though many people do not
realize that.
To achieve socialist and communist goals, a total
mobilization of human and natural resources is needed. This
mobilization cannot be accomplished by mass spontaneity,
which has the tendency only of achieving immediate goals
that provide instant satisfaction. This practice will dilute
the effort and delay the advancement toward the major goals
which will offer greater satisfactions with lasting effects
for all citizens. To stay on the right track a vanguard is
needed to lead the masses; this is the place filled by the
Party. Its leading role is justified by its higher
political consciousness and ideological education, which
enables its members to understand the historical path of
societal development. Its existence is demanded by the
historical evolution of society; its legitimacy is the
political character of society. It is acting in accordance
with society's interests, thus implicitly serving its
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citizens. If its role is not understood yet by all citizens
it is because of the lack of their political education. The
higher the political education of the masses the greater
will be the chances for society to reach its socialist and
communist goals. From this derives the necessity of a
permanent political-educational program that will result in
the creation of a new man with higher humanistic qualities
suitable for the future society.
Emphasizing the higher importance of ideological
educational activity, Ceausescu concludes: "There is no
exaggeration in saying that the very communist future of our
homeland depends on the successful development of this
12
work."
It appears obvious from this presentation that the
RCP's ideology, molded by Ceausescu's personalized thinking,
totally justifies the Party's leading role in Romania. And
this is the basic idea that was underlined throughout this
study. What other proof of communist loyalty can the
Soviets possibly ask for, other than those offered by the
RCP's domestic policy? For the last twenty years no other
Soviet satellite in Eastern Europe has preserved internal
communist orthodoxy so rigorously and in so rigid a manner.
Ceausescu's ideology, which is nothing more then a
theoretical device for enforcing this orthodoxy, thus
represents the Party's best defense against Soviet
suspicions created by Romania's external behavior. And as
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events have demonstrated until now, this "ill-behavior" has
been always counteracted by a "healthy" domestic policy. It
seems that Ceausescu's unabated commitment to his historical
mission of building socialism and communism on Romanian
soil, and his obsessive vision of creating the new socialist
man, have weighed more in Soviet eyes than his international
rhetoric or misconduct.
PART III
CONCLUSIONS
Romania's dissidence within the Soviet bloc is a
complex phenomenon determined during the last two decades by
interrelated factors of an historical, economical, social
and political nature. From this complex phenomenon, this
study has separated for examination only one aspect, namely
Soviet tolerance of Romania's dissidence.
This analysis has focused upon the role played in
this process by the RCP during 1965-1985 period. The result
of this analysis has confirmed this study's hypothesis that
Romania's tight internal policy has represented one of the
major reasons for Soviet tolerance of the former's
independent foreign policy. The study has shown that in the
last two decades the RCP has maintained a total and
undisputed internal control, which has led foreign observers
to label Romania as the most tightly orthodox communist
state in Eastern Europe. This internal orthodoxy can be
summarized in the following conclusions:
1. During the 1965-1985 period,the RCP constantly enlarged
its representative character by increasing its membership
and extending its organizational and territorial coverage.
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The party also consolidated its structural unity and
hierarch and totally subordinated state and mass
organizations to its leadership. Emphasizing its status as
a mass organization and its firm internal control over
society, the Party sent to the Soviets a clear message
assuring them of Romania's internal stability, but also
stressing same time its unabated commitment to the
preservation of the country's sovereignty.
2. The Party's domestic policy was characterized by the
repression of human rights and democratic liberties. This
fact was illustrated by the crushing of the intellectual and
religious dissident movement for human rights, the harsh
repression of the miners' strike in the Jiu Valley in 1977,
the rigid control and censorship imposed upon Romania's
cultural life, and the opposition to emigration.
3. For almost twenty years the RCP has been ruled by the
absolutist leadership of Nicolae Ceausescu. Following a few
years of struggle for power in the mid-1960s, during which
he removed from the Party's top positions any potential
rivals belonging to the old guard, he consolidated his
position as the head of both the party and the state.
Surrounded by an elite of relatives and close associates who
protect his absolute power, Ceausescu has engaged in a
non-stop campaign of glorification comparable in size and
intensity with Stalin's cult of personality. He has used
Romania's dissidence in the international sphere as a
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springboard for achieving his ambitions of political power
and international recognition.
4. Romania's internal orthodoxy has found its justification
in the Party's ideology. The RCP's ideology, representing a
blend of Marxist-Leninist principles and Ceausescu' s
philosophical concepts, emphasizes the necessity of the
Party's leading role in society as the only way of achieving
the historical task of socialism: the creation of a new
man. Since this long and complex historical process
requires a high level of socialist consciousness, the Party
set up a permanent program of indoctrination that
practically includes the entire population of the country.
Through this program the RCP intends to raise the political
and ideological level of the population so that they have a
better understanding of the party's political role and
policy.
Romania's dissidence had its origin in a genuine
national desire for de-Russification and independence.
These popular aspirations were used by the RCP as the basis
for legitimacy and power, but were altered in time by
Ceausescu's personal ambitions. During the last two decades
Romania has indeed been the Soviet Union's most dissident
ally but at the same time its most devoted follower in
domestic policy. The RCP's desire was not to break with the
Socialist camp but to consolidate within it a regime of
national communism less dependent on the Soviet Union.
Since Romania's socialist status and its integration in the
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East European model were never challenged during this
process, it is understandable that the country's autonomous
foreign policy was framed by limitations and restrictions.
It can be said that these limitations which Romania has
learned to recognize and respect over the years, together
with its self-proclamation in the international arena as a
country committed to peace and international cooperation,
have contributed to some degree to the avoidance of Soviet
military sanctions against it. However, based on this
study's research and analysis and the consideration of
opinions expressed by numerous scholars who have studied
Romania's case, it is this study's conclusion that Romania's
internal orthodoxy has been the major reason that has
prevented Soviet military intervention. The internal
orthodoxy, closely resembling the main features of Soviet
society, represented the guarantee of communist loyalty
presented to the Soviets by the RCP in exchange for
Romania's external behavior.
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